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Charles W. Wootton
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

and
Carel M. Wolk
UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE AT MARTIN

THE DEVELOPMENT OF "THE BIG
EIGHT" ACCOUNTING FIRMS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1900 TO 1990
Abstract: This paper examines the growth and changing role of the
accounting profession in the United States from 1900 to 1990 with
special emphasis on "Big Eight" accounting firms. Major political,
economic, and social events of the period and their influence on the
accounting profession are analyzed. Each decade is examined in turn,
and the historical consequences of the decade on "Big Eight" accounting firms in total and individually are presented.

The beginning of the Twentieth Century marked the beginning of public accounting as a profession for several reasons. In
1896, the State of New York passed a law restricting the use of
the title "Certified Public Accountant" to those passing a state
examination. This law was soon followed by similar laws in
other states. The establishment of a required examination provided accountants with a more professional image, similar to
the one provided lawyers by the bar examination. Furthermore,
these laws helped ensure a market for the services of those passing the examination. The responsibility of many accounting
firms expanded beyond merely handling bankruptcies and liquidations to auditing client financial statements. By 1900, six of
the firms that would become "The Big Eight" had been founded.
The establishment, survival and growth of these CPA firms, as
well as the profession as a whole, was due to the rapid industrialization at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. During this
time, the corporate form of ownership began its rise to prominence, along with a corresponding separation of management
and ownership. Previts and Merino [1979, p. 129] emphasize the
importance of these changes in A History of Accounting in
America'. "Perhaps the most important development, in retrospect, for the emergence of the public accounting profession,
was the rise of financial capitalism."
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In many respects, the accounting profession was relatively
stable, conservative, and slow-growing during the first half of
this century. Yet, at the same time, it faced major social and
economic events that would drastically change its scope and
direction. Two World Wars, the imposition of an income tax,
world-wide depression, and major new social legislation all
served to expand the role and responsibility of the public accountant. The second half of the century presented perhaps
even greater challenges. Specifically, "Big Eight" accounting
firms had to adapt to the internationalization of American business [Hall, 1987], an expanding service economy, the rapid
growth of nonaudit services, an explosive growth in size, and
the rise of a competitive environment for CPA services
[Bernstein, 1978].
This paper serves to examine the growth and changing role
of the public accounting profession in the United States from
1900 to 1990 with special emphasis on "Big Eight" accounting
firms. Major political, economic, and social events of the period
and their influence on the profession are analyzed. Each decade
is examined in turn, and the historical consequences of the decade on "Big Eight" accounting firms in total and individually
are presented.
1900 - 1910
RECOGNITION OF A PROFESSION
The early 1900s saw a continuation of a corporate merger
pattern that began around 1895. From 1895 to 1905, many
mergers occurred that required experienced auditors to examine
the books and financial statements of the companies involved
[Littleton, 1962], The role of the auditor in these mergers can be
illustrated by an examination of the audit records of Jones, Caesar & Co., an agent for Price Waterhouse & Co. (and later a part
of Price Waterhouse). In June 1899, J. P. Morgan & Co. combined several independent tube companies to form the National
Tube Company. Jones, Caesar & Co. was engaged to audit the
records of the component companies for ten years, prepare financial statements for these years, and prepare a system that
would put all components on a comparable accounting basis. In
the same year, Jones, Caesar & Co. was engaged to examine the
merger of four companies that formed the Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Company, and twenty-seven companies that formed the
American Hide and Leather Company. To audit the companies
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involved, Jones, Caesar & Co. rapidly increased its staff. Fees
grew at a corresponding rate, resulting in the firm having the
best operating year since its founding in 1890 [DeMond, 1951].
As the corporate merger wave continued over the next few
years, additional auditors were needed. Since the companies involved were often geographically diverse, accounting firms began to open branch offices. Haskins & Sells opened offices in
Chicago (1900), London (1901), Cleveland and St. Louis (1902),
Pittsburgh (1903), and Baltimore (1910) [Haskins & Sells, 1947].
Lybrand, Ross Brothers & Montgomery, founded in Philadelphia, had offices in New York, Pittsburgh, and Chicago by 1910
[Edwards, 1960], Arthur Young & Co. had offices in Chicago,
Kansas City, New York City, and Milwaukee by the end of the
decade [The Arthur Young Journal, 1969].
Another change created by the corporate merger movement
was an increased responsibility to third parties. In most merger
situations, the accounting firm was not engaged directly by the
audited company but by a bank or holding company overseeing
the merger. For routine financial statement audits, auditors had
traditionally been selected by the officers or directors of the
company. However, United States Steel was the first major
company to forgo this tradition. On February 17, 1902, the
stockholders of the United States Steel Corporation elected
Price Waterhouse & Co. as auditor for the firm. This change
expanded auditor responsibility beyond or the corporate officers
to the stockholders [DeMond, 1951]. Election of auditors by the
stockholders quickly expanded to most major corporations in
the United States.
In 1909, the United States took the first step toward an
income tax. As recently as 1896, the Supreme Court of the
United States had ruled that an income tax was unconstitutional. In order to evade this ruling, Congress passed a franchise
tax — not an income tax — on corporations. However, the franchise tax was based on corporate income as measured by cash
receipts. With passage of this law, corporations found it necessary to set up accounting systems that would determine their
revenues and expenses. Although most corporations had kept
minimal accounting records, many had never set up a system to
determine actual income. Therefore, corporations were often
forced to rely on their auditors to set up the necessary system
[Edwards, 1960].
The early 1900s was a period of notable change for two of
the "Big Eight" firms. In 1900, John B. Niven left Price
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Waterhouse & Co. to form a partnership with George A. Touche
(of George A. Touche & Co., London), under the name of Touche, Niven, & Co. for the purpose of public accounting in the
United States [Swanson, 1972]. Three years later, two brothers
Alwin C. and Theodore C. Ernst formed the accounting partnership of Ernst & Ernst in Cleveland, Ohio. One of its first clients
was Thompson Ramo Wooldridge (TRW) and the charge for its
first audit was $25 [Ernst & Ernst, 1960].
1910 - 1920
THE GROWTH OF A PROFESSION
The years between 1910 and 1920 were very important in
the history of public accounting in the United States. It was in
this decade that the first federal income tax was passed. When
the franchise tax was enacted in 1909, the rate was set at one
percent of net income. Probably due to this low rate there was
minimal opposition. Because of the lack of opposition to the
tax, the government's need to raise additional revenue, and the
Supreme Court's previous rulings that an income tax was unconstitutional, Congress proposed the Sixteenth Amendment to
the Constitution. This Amendment was quickly ratified by the
states, and became effective March 1, 1913 [Carey, 1969]. This
Amendment permitted the enactment of "direct" taxes such as
the federal income tax which Congress passed quickly in 1913.
Although the initial tax rate was low (1 percent of income in
excess of $3,000 increasing progressively to 7 percent of net
income beyond $500,000), the law affected corporations as well
as individuals who now had to measure their incomes, many for
the first time. With the entrance of the United States into World
War I, the low tax rates of 1913 and the complexities of the tax
laws quickly increased. Perhaps the "Excess Profits Tax", imposed on business in 1917, stimulated the demand for tax services from accounting firms to a greater extent than the 1913
Income Tax. This increased the need for CPAs was because "excess profits" had to be measured as well as the capital invested,
and given the high tax rate on excess profits, the calculation was
important.
One of the first accounting firms to develop a tax service
was Arthur Andersen & Co. The firm's founder, Arthur Andersen, had been a professor of accounting at Northwestern University. It was his association with the University that led him to
develop one of the first courses in Federal Taxation to be of-
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fered at the college-level. The course was offered during the
academic year 1917-1918, and it attracted judges, bankers, lawyers, accountants, and business executives. Partially because of
these courses, Arthur Andersen & Co. attracted new clients and
became known for its expertise in the income tax field. The
history of Arthur Andersen & Co., The First Fifty Years: 19131963 [Higgins et al., 1963] states:
Our tax work for new clients often led to other engagements in the fields of auditing, systems work and business counseling. No small part of the increase in our
fees to $188,000 in 1919 and $322,000 in 1920 was due
to our early preparation and vigorous effort in the field
of federal taxes, [pp. 23-24]
World War I had another major impact on the accounting
profession. As a result of the War, the accounting firm became
an advisor for financial affairs. During the war years, it was
often the responsibility of the auditor to determine the cost of
goods manufactured for the government and/or for other firms.
In addition to these cost studies, accounting firms were engaged
as efficiency experts with the responsibility of increasing the
capacity and efficiency of war manufacturers. One of the most
active firms in the expansion of services beyond the traditional
auditing role was Arthur Young & Co. Arthur Young was engaged by the British government to determine the costs of
manufacturing the new Enfield rifles. Furthermore, when the
United States entered the war, the government called on Arthur
Young & Co. to conduct many of the special investigations of
companies owned by foreign nationals [Edwards, 1960].
The decade of the 1910s was the first period in which a
federal agency became involved in the establishment of accounting standards or procedures in the United States. In Britain, the
government had played a fairly active role in the development of
accounting through the passage of the Companies Acts. Accounting in the United States — although based largely on the
British system — had not been guided or regulated by the government. In 1913, Congress established the Federal Reserve System and one year later the Federal Trade Commission. The Federal Reserve System had its first major influence on the public
accounting profession in 1918 when it issued the pamphlet, Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance Sheet Statements.
This pamphlet presented the minimum auditing procedures that
should be followed in any audit [Carey, 1969]. Although these
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procedures were only recommendations by the Federal Reserve,
they hastened the establishment of minimum auditing standards by many accounting firms.
During this decade, three of the "Big Eight" firms underwent significant reformation. In 1913, Arthur Andersen and
Clarence M. Delany purchased the net assets of a small Chicago
accounting firm, The Audit Company of Illinois, for $4,000 and
the firm that became Arthur Andersen & Co. was founded
[Louis, 1970]. In 1911, William Peat met James Marwick on a
voyage to Europe, and by the time the ship arrived, they had
agreed to merge the accounting firm of Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
with the firm of W. B. Peat & Co. to form Marwick, Mitchell,
Peat & Co. (later to become Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.)
[Wise, 1966]. In 1919, Ernst & Ernst decided it needed an overseas representative and a working relationship was established
with Whinney, Smith & Whinney of London [Ernst & Ernst,
1960]. Fifty years later these two firms would merge to form
Ernst & Whinney.
After World War I, many "Big Eight" firms experienced an
increased demand for their services overseas and opened offices
there. Of course, firms such as Price Waterhouse & Co. had
been founded in Europe and already had offices throughout the
Continent. However, other firms now felt the need to expand
their operations beyond the United States in order to be competitive. The internationalization of numerous clients added impetus to this expansion. One of the first American firms to open
a European branch was Haskins & Sells who opened an office
in London in April, 1900. In 1919, Haskins & Sells opened a
second overseas office in Shanghai, and in the following year, it
opened offices in Paris and Havana [Haskins & Sells, 1947].
1920 - 1930
N E W SERVICES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The decade of the 1920s was described by John Carey in
The Rise of the Accounting Profession: 1896-1936 [1969]:
The U. S. emerged from the War a creditor nation for
the first time in its history. Then began a period of
unparalleled growth and prosperity, characterized by
industrial expansion, mergers, holding company empires and unfortunately, some unsound financial practices. This period ended abruptly in 1930. [p. 144]
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For "Big Eight" accounting firms, much of this growth
came from an expansion of the advisory services they offered
clients. In addition to traditional auditing service, they began to
move beyond tax return preparation by starting to offer tax advice and to help companies implement accounting systems necessary for proper generation of tax information. By the 1920s,
most large accounting firms had a tax department or tax service. Aiding the expansion of advisory services was the growth
of industrial companies and the merger of several smaller companies into larger ones. Much of the capital for expansion or
merger came from investment bankers. These bankers often
sought an independent firm to investigate corporate financial
condition before they committed their funds. Importantly, many
bankers wanted more than just an audit of financial records.
They wanted an investigation of all phases of the business. In
order to meet these needs, accounting firms had to expand their
operating methods. In The First Fifty Years: 1913-1963 [Higgins
et al., 1963], Arthur Andersen & Co. related the changes it made:
The firm developed financial investigation reports
which went into many phases of a business other than
financial and accounting, including labor relations,
availability of raw materials, plants, products, markets,
effectiveness of the organization and future prospects.
The methods which were used in developing these reports involved a study of company policies and their
effectiveness, and the performance of management in
carrying them out. [p. 32]
Ernst & Ernst had an early entry into the management service area. Within five years after it was founded in 1903, it
created a separate management service area known as its Service Division. In the early years of the company, the Service
Division dealt mostly with accounting and financial matters,
such as cost accounting procedures or the prospective results of
a merger. However, in the mid-1920s, the emphasis changed.
The new approach became: If we can identify a problem, why
not offer a solution? Ernst & Ernst referred to this new emphasis as "constructive accounting." Armed with this outlook, Ernst
& Ernst began to assist management in analyses of the entire
business operation. It examined the organizational structure,
delegation of duties, physical layout, departmental relationships, and many other areas. In addition to being an accounting
firm, it was also now a management consultant.

Published by eGrove, 1992

17

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 19 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 7
8

The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1992

Regarding "constructive accounting," A. C. Ernst, cofounder of Ernst & Ernst, [McAnly, no date] wrote:
The service of the able modern accountant does not
stop with the development of a system or the making of
an audit. His work, giving him in most cases an intimated knowledge of the operations and condition of a
concern, makes him feel the natural responsibility on
matters of organization, method and policy. [p. 294]
Along with the expansion of the scope of services offered,
the accounting firm had to expand its employment practices. In
addition to accounting personnel, it needed industrial engineers, market-research specialists, production and personnel experts. With this entry into management consulting and the expansion of its staff, the accounting firm entered a new era of
opportunity and responsibility.
The 1920s brought a tremendous increase in the size of the
accounting firms and their billings. One "Big Eight" firm that
had particularly impressive growth was Arthur Andersen & Co.
In 1920, Arthur Andersen & Co. had two partners and fifty-four
employees; however, by 1930 the number of partners had increased to seven and the number of employees to three hundred
and seventy-eight. Furthermore, in 1920 it had billings of
$322,000, and by 1929 its billings had increased to $2,023,000
[Higgins et al., 1963], representing a growth in revenue of over
500 percent for the decade.
As in the previous two decades, the major accounting firms
continued to increase the number of branch offices. In the
1920s, Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery opened offices in
Chicago and Seattle (1920), Cleveland and Cincinnati (1923),
and Baltimore, San Francisco and Los Angeles (1924) [L.R.B. &
M. Journal, 1958]. In the same period, Arthur Young & Co.
opened branches in Los Angeles (1920), Pittsburgh (1921), London, Paris, and Dallas (1923), and Tulsa (1929) [The Arthur
Young Journal, 1969].
In addition to growth, this period was one of legal challenge
to accounting firms. In 1926, the highest court of New York, the
New York Court of Appeals, effectively ruled in Craig vs. Anyon
that an auditor's legal liability was extremely limited as long as
an auditor exercised "reasonable care" in performing the audit.
The case involved Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co. (later to merge
with Peat, Marwick, Mitchell) which had failed to discover a
defalcation of an employee of its client over a period of nearly
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five years. In this decision, which predates today's burgeoning
awards in tort actions for negligence, the court awarded the
plaintiff client only the restitutionary measure of damages, that
is, the amount the client had paid for the accounting services,
$2,000 [Chatfield, 1977].
However, the year 1925 also brought the Ultramares case.
The Stern Company, audited by Touche, Niven, & Co. was declared bankrupt, and in the following year, the Ultramares Corporation filed suit against the auditors charging them with negligence; later a charge of fraud was added. Over the next six
years, this suit went though several appeals, before the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York ordered a new trial in the
case. Before the new trial could be held, there was an out-ofcourt settlement. It was not the trial itself that would be remembered, but the descriptive writing of Judge Cardozo of the Court
of Appeals on the responsibility of the public accountant. In his
decision, Judge Cardozo stated that third parties can recover
damages from an accountant where fraud can be proved, and
gross negligence is sufficient evidence from which one can infer
fraud. This statement (strengthened by the Securities Acts in the
next decade) brought forth a new principle: the liability and
responsibility of an auditor to third parties [Edwards, 1960].
1930 - 1940
DEPRESSION AND REGULATION
During the preceding decade, most accounting firms had
enjoyed rapid growth due to the increased importance of the
federal income tax and the expansion of services they offered.
By 1930, though, the Great Depression had started in the United
States and accounting firms were not immune to its effect. As
corporate profits and sales decreased, demand for management
and financial services decreased. Furthermore, many companies
failed during this period, and consequently had no need for auditors.
As mentioned in the previous section, in 1929 Arthur
Andersen & Co. had fees of $2,023,000. By 1932 these fees had
decreased to $1,488,000 [Higgins et al., 1963]. Arthur Young &
Co. felt the Depression's effects even more acutely. From 1931
to 1933, the number of hours charged to clients were cut in half.
Most accounting firms had increased their staffs during the
1920s, but were now forced to reduce personnel — and those
who remained took pay cuts. The Depression also brought a
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sharp reduction in the cost of an audit. During this period, the
average cost of an audit was between $500 and $700 [The Arthur
Young Journal, 1969] approximately half of what it was before
the Depression.
However, by 1933, changes began to occur that would have
a profound effect on the growth of "Big Eight" firms. These
changes principally resulted from the collapse of the securities
markets in 1929 and the resulting losses to millions of investors.
At the same time, it was revealed that massive fraud had occurred in Kreuger and Toll, a company listed on the New York
Stock Exchange. This fraud had occurred between 1917 and
1932 without being detected [Higgins, 1965]. As a result, the
NYSE announced on January 6, 1933, that companies applying
for a listing would have to have an audit certificate for their
financial statements and this audit must be performed by an
independent certified public accountant. This announcement
was followed by another on October 24, 1933, that required all
companies to follow certain standard accounting methods. It
also required that the scope of the audit not be less than that
indicated in the pamphlet, Verification of Financial Statements,
issued by the Federal Reserve Board in 1929 [Edwards, 1960].
With the requirement of an independent auditor and an increased audit scope, the NYSE helped create a new and larger
market for major accounting firms.
Another change that resulted from the collapse of the securities market was the passage by Congress of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The purpose
of the Securities Act of 1933 was to provide full and fair disclosure of information relating to the issuance of securities sold in
interstate and foreign commerce. The 1933 Act required that,
before securities are sold, a prospectus be provided to potential
investors. Furthermore, under the Act; officers, directors, underwriters, and accountants could be held liable for any loss that
resulted to an investor from material omissions or misstatements in the prospectus. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
had the stated purpose of regulating the securities exchanges
and the over-the-counter market operating in interstate and foreign commerce. The administration of both Acts was given to a
new Securities and Exchange Commission. The 1934 Act required that all financial statements filed with the SEC be certified by an independent public accountant. Enactment of both
Acts resulted in increased prestige for the public accounting
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profession, and enlarged their responsibility to shareholders
and to the general public alike. Not only did accountants have a
social responsibility to the public, but they now had a potential
legal liability to that public as well. The importance of these
Acts to accounting firms can be seen by a statement in The First
Fifty Years: 1913-1963 [Higgins et al., 1963], in which authors of
the history of Arthur Andersen & Co. stated:
As was probably true of many of the national firms,
our practice increased materially from the many cases
where the firm was asked by new clients to examine
their financial statements which were to be included in
prospectuses issued in connection with registering their
security offerings. [p. 44]
Although the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 increased the billings of the major accounting firms, the importance of these firms was already well established by 1932. In two articles, "Architects of the U. S. Balance
Sheets" and "Certified Public Accountants," published in June,
1932, Fortune examined the role and size of the major accounting firms. At the time of the articles, companies listed on the
NYSE were not required to have statements "certified", but in
its examination, Fortune reviewed the 701 companies that did
have their financial statements certified by public accountants.
Using audited NYSE companies as its criteria, Fortune's eight
largest firms were: Price Waterhouse & Co.; Haskins & Sells;
Ernst & Ernst; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; Arthur Young &
Co.; Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery; Touche, Niven & Co.;
and Arthur Andersen & Co. Although their names would change
in subsequent mergers, each of these firms maintained or expanded their leadership position in the public accounting profession, eventually being referred to as "the Big Eight".
As the number and size of their clients increased, accounting firms also changed. In the 1930s, one of the most important
changes made was industry specialization. A leader in this respect was Arthur Andersen & Co. Mr. Andersen decided early on
that it was not possible for one person to have adequate knowledge to furnish needed management and financial services to all
companies. Instead, he maintained that accountants should
concentrate their efforts on particular industries and become
specialists. Therefore, when faced with a management service or
auditing problem in a specialized industry, expert knowledge
would be available [Higgins et al., 1963]. The concept of indus-
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try specialization continued to grow and eventually most "Big
Eight" firms developed reputations for expertise in specific areas.
1940 - 1950
A TIME OF CHANGE
As the 1940s began, the effects of the Depression on the
accounting profession could still be seen. Many firms' billings
were little more than they had been ten years previously, and
many clients were still trying to minimize accounting services in
order to reduce costs. With the beginning of World War II, this
changed.
As in World War I, one of the first government actions was
the imposition of an excess profits tax. In addition to the imposition of new taxes, the government imposed new regulations
for cost determinations and new bidding procedures for defense
contracts. These regulations required companies to keep accurate and current financial records, and many relied on their
accounting firm to help ensure this need was met. Accounting
firms thus became involved with the day-to-day operations of
their clients in contrast to the audit-only relationship that existed in years past. In many cases, a close working relationship
developed between the corporate client and the accounting firm,
and the relationship continued after the war [Ernst & Ernst,
1960].
Although firms were pleased that the volume of work was
greater due to the new taxes and regulations, many firms had
problems coping in that substantial numbers of their employees
were being drafted into the armed forces. This shortage resulted
in the entry of many women into accounting and auditing positions. Women had been employed by many firms for years, but
primarily in secretarial positions. Because of this need for larger
staffs, firms increasingly sought women for professional positions. One firm that actively recruited women was Price
Waterhouse & Co. In the spring of 1943, Price Waterhouse began to recruit recent female college graduates for a special
eleven-week course in accounting and auditing at Northwestern
University. Upon completion of this course they were assigned
to the Chicago office. In the spring of 1944, other special
courses were offered to women who were to be assigned primarily to offices in Chicago and New York. In addition to this
special recruitment, many individual offices recruited women as
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accountants, so that in several of Price Waterhouse's offices 30
to 40 percent of the accounting staff were women during the
war [DeMond, 1951]. When the war ended, however, most
women working for major firms were replaced by men. It would
be the late 1960s before a significant number of women would
again enter the public accounting work force.
Another major accounting change occurred during World
War II. As John Carey [1970, p. 54] states: "Perhaps the most
important impact of the war on the practice of public accounting was the application of mathematical and systems approaches to the logistics problems of the military." These mathematical solutions to military problems would develop into
what is now called "operations research" or "scientific management". However, more important to many firms was the fact
that these services could be offered to clients. During the war,
good working relationships and respect had developed between
many corporations and their accounting firms. So, when offered
these services, many companies accepted them.
Although most "Big Eight" firms offered management services prior to World War II, it was only after the war that many
firms established separate divisions or departments for these
services. Ernst & Ernst, for example, established a Special Service Division several years prior to World War II, but this division had been generally restricted to tax advice and management consulting. In 1948, Special Services was reorganized into
a division called Management Service. The purpose of the Management Service Division was to provide knowledge and expertise to both the firm itself and corporate clients in the area of
data processing, operations research, organization and personnel, accounting and budgeting, and marketing. With this expanded service, the firm became an active participant in all facets of corporate decision making and contributed greatly to the
accounting firm's potential billings. From 1940 to 1949, the billings of Ernst & Ernst more than doubled, and much of this
increase was due to management services [Ernst & Ernst, 1960].
This expansion of management services led to criticism
both from within and outside the profession regarding the ability of public accountants to maintain independence and objectivity while auditing the clients to whom they also provided
management consulting. Critics argued that an inevitable conflict of interest results from providing the two services. Mednick
and Previts [1987, p. 227] concluded, however, that "there was
no conclusive evidence to support such an assertion, and . . . the
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market seemed to be looking for 'one-stop shopping,' or a convenient professional service package of all three activities —
attest, tax and consulting — in which CPA competency clearly
provided a comparative benefit." This conflict was far from resolved, and continues today [Hodges, 1987].
In 1947, an important realignment of "Big Eight" firms occurred. George Bailey joined Ernst & Ernst in 1912 upon graduating from college, and by 1922 was managing partner of the
Detroit office. Over the next several years, differences developed
between Bailey and A. C. Ernst who had founded the firm in
1902. By 1947, these differences had increased to the point that
Bailey left Ernst & Ernst accompanied by another partner, John
McEachren, and eleven associates and started the firm of
George Bailey & Co. [Swanson, 1972]. Because Chrysler Corporation would only agree to follow Bailey to his new firm if there
was a nationwide organization to service its account, Bailey
quickly combined with two well-established firms — Allen R.
Smart & Co. and Touche, Niven, & Co. Allen R. Smart & Co.
was started in the United States in 1927 while Touche, Niven &
Co. was founded in the United States in 1900. On August 27, the
partnership of Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart was announced,
and the realignment was complete [Swanson, 1972].
1950 - 1960
GROWTH THROUGH MERGER
As American corporations became larger, more complex,
and international in scope, auditing them became more difficult. By 1950, most major accounting firms had offices in major
U.S. cities, but they did not have offices in the smaller cities
where their clients were located or in the foreign countries to
which their clients were expanding. Furthermore, the expansion
of management services required more personnel, often resulting in shortages in the audit staff. An answer to these problems
was afforded by mergers with smaller local accounting firms. A
merger enabled a large firm to obtain an accounting office in a
city where its client was located, and at the same time, to obtain
experienced personnel familiar with local practices.
An examination of Haskins & Sells gives a good example of
the merger pattern of the 1950s. Between 1923 and 1952,
Haskins & Sells merged with only three firms. However, between 1952 and 1960, it was involved in nineteen mergers expanding its operations to: London and San Francisco (1952),
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New York (1953), Portland and San Diego (1954), San Juan and
Cincinnati (1955), Los Angeles, Rochester, Honolulu, Omaha,
and Birmingham (1956), Seattle (1957), Hilo and Rochester
(1958), Phoenix and Salt Lake City (1959), and San Diego and
Dallas (1960) [Haskins & Sells, 1970]. Haskins & Sells was not
alone in this merger trend. During this period, most "Big Eight"
firms used mergers as means of growth and expansion.
Of the many mergers in the 1950s, the most important one
occurred on November 21, 1950, and would be today's equivalent of a merger of two "Big Eight" firms. On that date, Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. merged with Barrow, Wade, Guthrie &
Co. under the former's name. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co.,
established in 1883, was probably the first national accounting
firm in the United States, and at the time of the merger was
nearly equal in size to either Arthur Young & Co. or Touche,
Niven, Bailey & Smart, both "Big Eight" firms [Wise, 1982].
Through this merger, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., already
one of the largest accounting firms in the United States, expanded its client base and grew even larger.
As clients grew larger and more complex, the traditional
audit had to be expanded to meet this challenge. In Touche
Ross: A Biography, Theodore Swanson [1972] wrote of the
change:
During the eventful decade of the fifties, the Touche
Ross accounting and auditing practice developed its
present distinctive character and form . . . The growing
complexities of auditing, and the burden of documentation, invited what could have become an undue emphasis on mechanics — a regimented organizational approach which would leave little room for individual
judgment and personal development. The problem . . .
was how to extend the area of judgment so as to develop "thinking auditors" . . . it meant that Touche Ross
auditors would have to be trained and equipped to audit not merely the books but the business, [p. 28]
This last sentence is very important, for it emphasizes the
enlarged scope of the 1950s audit, to consider the whole business entity, not just its financial records. Auditing the whole
business involved a study of the company's internal control system. For the first time, accounting firms truly appreciated the
fact that the strength of a firm's internal control determined the
scope and depth of the audit itself. A new term, "integrated
audit program", developed in this decade and reflected the rec-
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ognition that an accounting firm could no longer audit only
financial records, but had to examine the corporation as an
integrated system.
By the end of the 1950s, "the Big Eight" were national firms
with offices in every major city and many smaller ones. Based
on U.S. revenues, the two largest "Big Eight" firms were Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell, & Co. and Arthur Andersen & Co. with estimated billings of more than $40 million each. Next in size were
Ernst & Ernst, Price Waterhouse & Co., and Haskins & Sells
with billings estimated at more than $30 million each. The sixth
and seventh firms, Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery and
Arthur Young & Co., reported billings of more than $25 million;
while the smallest firm, Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart (formerly
Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart), had estimated billings of $17
million [Wise, I960].
1960- 1970
CONTINUED GROWTH AND INTERNATIONALIZATION
In many ways, the period 1960-1970 was similar to the previous decade. The major accounting firms continued the merger
patterns started in the 1950s. As previously noted, Haskins &
Sells merged with nineteen accounting firms between 1950 and
1960. In the next decade, Haskins & Sells merged with yet another nineteen firms. As before, these mergers were geographically diverse — from Boston to Memphis to San Antonio
[Haskins & Sells, 1970]. The merger strategy was seen as the
best way to obtain needed personnel and offices.
Arthur Young, on the other hand, had resisted the merger
trend prevalent among other "Big Eight" firms throughout the
1950s. However, during the 1960s Arthur Young realized that to
be competitive, it needed to expand. Mergers with geographically diverse firms offered the solution. Merger activity during
this decade increased the number of Arthur & Young partners
from 100 in 1960 to over 250 by 1970 [The Arthur Young Quarterly, 1980].
The expansion of the major accounting firms was not limited to the United States. Several of "the Big Eight" firms were
founded in Britain or Scotland and had been international firms
since the early 1900s when they opened offices in the United
States or in Continental Europe. By the 1960s, most of the firms
founded in the United States had offices in other countries or
had established working relationships with foreign accounting
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firms. Ernst & Ernst, for example, expanded internationally by
establishing a working relationship with Whinney, Smith &
Whinney. Through this relationship, they opened four offices in
Canada, five in South America, one in Central America, twelve
in Europe, and one in Japan during the 1960s [Ernst & Ernst,
I960].
The decade witnessed a tremendous increase in billings for
members of "the Big Eight". This increase was due to several
factors, including: growth through merger, an increase in services offered, client growth, an increase in nonprofit accounting, and rising inflation. In 1968, Fortune estimated the United
States billings for members of "the Big Eight" as follows [Louis,
1968]: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. ($125 million), Arthur
Andersen & Co. ($100 million), Ernst & Ernst ($95 million),
Price Waterhouse & Co. ($95 million), Haskins & Sells ($80
million), Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery ($65 million),
Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart (becoming Touche Ross & Co. in
1969) ($60 million), and Arthur Young & Co. ($57 million). A
comparison of these billings with billings a decade earlier shows
the dramatic increase that occurred. For example, Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co.'s estimated billings increased from $45
million in 1960 to $125 million in 1968 while Ernst & Ernst's
billings increased from $36 million to $95 million. Each of these
firms almost tripled their billings in just eight years.
One "Big Eight" firm that published its financial statements
during this period was Arthur Andersen & Co. An examination
of the year 1970 illustrates the growth that occurred in the decade of the 1960s. In 1970, Arthur Andersen reported worldwide
billings of $190,154,000 and earnings of $47,937,000. The 1970
earnings were greater than the firm's United States billings ($40
million) for 1960 [Arthur Andersen Annual Report, 1979].
The 1960s also brought problems to "the Big Eight" firms.
Of paramount importance was an increase in lawsuits. The decade witnessed an unprecedented deluge of lawsuits against
"Big Eight" firms. Several of these suits were successful; others
were settled out of court. Of special significance to accountants
was a change in the viewpoint of the courts regarding the responsibility of the auditor. Up to this time, courts were reluctant to question an auditor's use of "generally accepted accounting principles," and auditors' adherence to these principles was
usually a strong defense. In 1968, however, in the Continental
Vending case, U. S. District Court Judge Walter R. Mansfield
ruled that adherence to generally accepted principles is not an
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adequate defense if the court finds that further disclosure was
needed [Louis, 1970]. This case brought a new awareness of the
potential liability of auditors.
1970 - 1980
A TIME OF CHALLENGE
Prior to the 1970s, accounting firms were basically conservative entities, content to wait for clients to come to them. In
the early 1900s, Ernst & Ernst advertised for clients and had
actively solicited new accounts. These actions resulted in conflicts with other firms. The Ohio Society of CPAs responded by
redrawing its rules to greatly limit solicitation of clients [Ernst
& Ernst, I960]. For the next several decades, the accounting
profession discouraged, and the AICPA's Code of Ethics prohibited, active solicitation of clients from other accounting firms.
However, in the late 1970s this changed. After several court
cases involving other professions and an implied suit by the
Justice Department, the AICPA's Code of Ethics was modified to
allow advertising and client solicitation [Hermanson et al.,
1987]. The political and economic climate of the late 1960s and
early 1970s served to foster changing attitudes towards competition by many in the profession. By 1978, the heretofore noncompetitive world of accounting had altered to the extent that
Fortune published an article by Peter W. Bernstein entitled
"Competition Comes to Accounting." In this article, Bernstein
analyzed the changing environment [p. 89]: "The big accounting
firms have not yet taken to the streets with sandwich boards to
hawk their wares, but a fierce competitive struggle is transforming their once-staid behavior."
The trend of growth through merger continued for the "Big
Eight" firms during the 1970s. Two are particularly noteworthy.
Ernst & Ernst, an American firm, had had an informal working
relationship with the British firm, Whinney, Smith & Whinney,
since the 1920s. In 1979, these two firms formally merged, creating Ernst & Whinney, an international firm with offices in 71
countries and billings in excess of $500 million [Wall Street
Journal, 17 January 1979]. Similarly, in 1978, Deloitte, Plender,
Griffith & Co. merged its United States practice with the British
firm of Haskins & Sells to formalize a long-term affiliation and
establish Deloitte Haskins & Sells [Wall Street Journal, 10 January 1978].
By the 1970s, most "Big Eight" firms were large interna-
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tional partnerships; moreover, they often were larger than the
companies they audited. Arthur Andersen & Co.'s financial reports illustrated the growth experienced by "Big Eight" firms
during the 1970s. In 1970, Arthur Andersen & Co. had operating
fees of $190,514,000. By 1975, billings had increased to
$386,341,000, and by 1979, were $645,433,000. Impressively, in
just nine years, operating revenues had more than tripled. Furthermore, its earnings increased from $47,937,000 in 1970 to
$139,422,000 in 1979. The changing sources of these fees is also
noteworthy. In 1970, accounting and auditing services generated 68 percent, tax services represented 18 percent, and administrative services were 14 percent of billings. In 1979, accounting and auditing services decreased to 58 percent while tax services increased slightly to 19 percent of fees. On the other hand,
administrative services, increased from 14 percent to 23 percent
of the total fees generated in 1979 [Arthur Andersen Annual Report, 1979].
It was during the 1970s, however, that questions were
raised about "Big Eight" firms and their possible dominance of
the accounting profession. Many of these questions were raised
in the most comprehensive study that Congress had conducted
of the accounting profession since its investigations in the early
1930s. This study was prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Committee
on Government Operations of the United States Senate. The
study, entitled The Accounting Establishment [1976], has commonly been called "the Metcalf Report" after Senator Lee
Metcalf who chaired the Subcommittee. The report was very
critical of the "Big Eight" alleging that it controlled the AICPA
and its committees, greatly influenced the FASB, dominated the
auditing of large corporations, and dominated the practice of
accounting in the United States and probably throughout the
world. The report's recommendations included: greater oversight by Congress of accounting practices, establishment of financial accounting and auditing standards for publicly-owned
corporations, public reporting by the fifteen largest accounting
firms of their financial data and earnings, and consideration by
Congress of methods to increase competition among accounting
firms.
This report was followed by a series of hearings held by the
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management in
April, May, and June of 1977. During the hearings, testimony
was offered by members of the accounting profession which
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attacked the conclusions and recommendations of the Report.
The general consensus of the rebuttals was that large international firms were necessary to audit large industrial clients and
the accounting profession with "Eight" competitors was, in fact,
more competitive than nearly any other major industry. After a
review of the Staff Report and eight days of hearings, the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management issued its
report. Although the follow-up report was not as critical of the
"Big Eight" as the Staff Report, it urged an increase in competitive aspects of the accounting profession.
1980 - 1990
BIRTH OF THE "BIG SIX"
Although some firms had offered management consulting
since the early 1900s, it was in the 1980s that consulting became as important or more important than auditing for many
"Big Eight" firms. Fueling this growth was the increased competition among the "Big Eight" firms that began in the 1970s. As
firms competed for the same major audit clients, price cutting
became an important marketing tool to attract new clients (or
maintain existing ones). As a result, many firms emphasized
their management services in order to obtain the larger profit
margins provided by these services.
In 1978, it was estimated that between 7% and 21% of the
total revenues of individual "Big Eight" firms were generated by
their management consulting practices [Bernstein, 1978]. By
1988, the percentage ranged from 14% (Deloitte Haskins &
Sells) to 37% (Arthur Andersen) [Public Accounting Report,
March 15, 1989]. For the fiscal year ending August 31, 1989,
Arthur Andersen & Co. reported that $1,441.7 million of its
$3,381.9 million worldwide revenues were generated by its consulting arm, Andersen Consulting [Public Accounting Reports,
November 15, 1989]. This reflects the reality that 42.6% of the
firm's revenues was generated by consulting in contrast to
19.8% by the tax area and 37.6% by the accounting and audit
area.
As consulting became more important to the major firms, it
also created problems. Partners in the consulting area complained they were not adequately represented on important
committees in the firm. Another major complaint was that the
formula for distributing partnership profits did not give enough
consideration to the amount of profits created by each area (au-
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diting, tax, consulting) or the amount of revenues each partner
generated. Although consulting is a major profit area, it requires
a high level of capital investment in such things as expensive
computer programs. Consulting partners complained that the
firms were not reinvesting enough profits to ensure the area's
future success.
As noted, Arthur Andersen & Co. has for many years been
the "Big Eight" leader in the consulting area. However, over the
last few years, Arthur Andersen has also exemplified the growing power struggle between audit and tax partners on one side
and consulting partners on the other. The extent of this struggle
was illustrated in November 1988 when seven consulting partners quit to form their own consulting firm. As a result of these
defections and a major self-study completed in January 1989,
the partners of Arthur Andersen voted for a reorganization of
the firm. The firm was divided into two operating units — the
auditing/tax area and the consulting area, each responsible for
its own operations and staffing. A new compensation system
was also initiated that increased compensation to the consulting
partners and limited the consulting revenues that had to be
shared with the other area [Chicago Tribute, 13 April 1989]. As
other firms expand their consulting areas, they may well be
faced with problems similar to those experienced by Arthur
Andersen.
This growth in management consulting during the 1980s,
combined with highly visible corporate failures and financial
institution collapses, resulted in renewed public concern regarding the profession's ability to regulate itself and maintain independence when providing both consulting and auditing services.
The House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of
the Committee on Energy and Commerce, chaired by Rep. John
D. Dingell, conducted hearings to investigate concerns about the
accounting profession. In May 1985, in an interview with reporters of Management Accounting, Rep. Dingell indicated that
the committee had no specific agenda, "other than that it is
becoming rather clear to us that the regulatory process is not
being well served in many instances by the work being performed by auditors and accountants" [p. 22]. He went on to
indicate concerns regarding the issue of independence:
We have accountants who are going into the business
of being financial advisors as well as accountants. A
lawyer would regard this as a rather clear conflict of
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interest were he supposed to scrutinize the behavior of
a client and report on it and at the same time advise
that client on how it is supposed to behave, [p. 53]
During this same period, the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting ("the Treadway Commission"),
sponsored by the major professional accounting organizations,
met to study the issues of increased fraudulent financial reporting. The profession responded to issues raised by both the
Dingell Hearings and the Treadway Commission. In 1985, the
Auditing Standards Board issued ten exposure drafts of professional standards aimed at closing the "expectations gap" between the public's and the profession's assessment of the
auditor's responsibility. Eventually, nine Statements on Auditing Standards were issued, representing the most guidance ever
released at one time [Journal of Accountancy, July, 1988]. These
standards set forth the auditor's increased responsibility to detect fraud and illegal acts, to communicate important matters to
the audit committee of the issuer, to apply analytical review
procedures and evaluate internal controls on every engagement,
as well as a revision of the standard auditors' report to more
clearly convey the responsibilities of the independent auditor.
The decade witnessed a number of other significant
changes within the profession. In the 1980s, the number of
women entering public accounting rose dramatically, a trend
that had started in the early 1960s. Although the number of
women in accounting doubled between 1960 and 1970 and
again between 1970 and 1980 [Wescott, 1986], it was not until
the 1980s that most public accounting firms became aware that
their future success depended upon recruiting and retaining
women.
In the 1970s, the major accounting firms began to hire
women, but only in small numbers. During the late 1970s and
early 1980s, though, the need for professional accountants grew.
The supply of male accountants remained level, but an increasing number of college women selected accounting as their major. By the mid-1980s, nearly half of all accounting students
were women and by 1988 women comprised 52 percent of the
accounting majors [Accounting Today, October 24, 1988]. More
importantly, an even higher percentage of the "outstanding" accounting graduates (those meeting criteria typically sought by
the "Big Eight" firms) were women. "Big Eight" firms responded to this reality by actively recruiting women.
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During the 1980s, the number of women hired as a percentage of new CPAs increased until today most "Big Eight" firms
hire nearly an equal number of men and women. However, the
number of women holding manager and partner positions still
remains small. Although the number of women partners in "Big
Eight" firms doubled (69 to 157) between 1983 and 1986 [Hooks
& Cheramy, 1988] less than 4 percent of all "Big Eight" partners
are women [Public Accounting Report, November 15, 1989].
Other "minority" groups have achieved even less representation in the profession. Blacks, for example, make up over 3% of
doctors and 2% of lawyers, but less than 1% of CPAs in the
United States. Mitchell and Flintall [1990] estimated that only
50 of the 9,000 partners in the largest public accounting firms
are black.
Firms continued to expand through merger in the decade of
the 1980s. In 1984, Price Waterhouse and Deloitte Haskins &
Sells discussed the possibility of merging as a way of increasing
their competitive advantage in auditing while also increasing
their consulting opportunities [Business Week, September 24,
1984]. However, the merger plan failed when the agreement was
rejected by the British partners of both firms.
Thus, the first major accounting firm merger of the 1980s
joined the "Big Eight" firm, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., and
the international firm, K M G Main Hurdman. K M G Main
Hurdman had been created in 1979 by a merger of accounting
firms from West Germany, Netherlands, Britain, Canada, and
Australia and the American firm of Main Hurdman &
Cranstoun [Wall Street Journal, 26 July 1979]. Through this
merger, Klynveld Main Goerdeler, (KMG) aspired to be a major
firm in the United States. However, by the mid-1980s this goal
had not been achieved. Then in early 1985, KMG began merger
talks with Peat, Marwick, Mitchell [Berton, Wall Street Journal,
24 September 1985]. Because of the existence of structuring
problems and doubts expressed by some of the KMG partners,
these discussions terminated [Berton, Wall Street Journal, 25
September 1985]. In 1986, KMG Main Hurdman again decided
a partner was necessary for it to gain a stronger presence in the
United States. Ernst & Whinney made a formal merger offer to
KMG, but it was rejected. KMG then renewed talks with Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell. This time the discussions were successful. As
a result, KPMG Peat Marwick, the largest accounting firm in
the world was created with over $2.7 billion in worldwide revenues, nearly $1 billion more than the second ranked firm,
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Arthur Andersen [Berton, Wall Street Journal, 4 September
1986].
As leading "Big Eight" firms continued to grow, increased
their audit market shares, and expanded their services, some
analysts suggested that smaller "Big Eight" firms such as
Deloitte Haskins & Sells and Touche Ross should no longer be
included among the first tier accounting firms. As in past decades, these smaller firms looked to mergers as a way to provide
the growth necessary to continue to compete as first tier firms.
In 1989, Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young merged to
form Ernst & Young. Importantly, it was the need to grow and
compete "into the 1990s and beyond" that was emphasized
when Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young announced their
merger in 1989 [Journal of Accountancy, July, 1989]. The combined firms hold the number one audit position throughout
most of the world [Business Week, July 24, 1989]. It is interesting to note that an "anonymous delivery" of the Ernst & Young
prospectus to Accounting Today disclosed many heretofore unavailable facts about these firms. Robert Crane [1990] suggests
that the significantly larger earnings per Ernst & Whinney partner, together with analysis of other data, "suggest that the deal
was not the 'combination of equals' portrayed in the public relations campaign vigorously carried on by the two organizations"
[p. 13]. In 1989, Ernst & Whinney's conformed accrual earnings
per partner were $263,000 while Arthur Young's were only
$191,000, which Crane sees as representing an effective "buy
out" of Arthur Young by Ernst & Whinney.
After the breakdown in merger talks between Price
Waterhouse and Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Deloitte began discussions with Touche Ross. Again, the idea of being able to compete with the other firms was emphasized as an important consideration [The New York Times, 7 July 1989]. As previously
mentioned, Deloitte Haskins & Sells had traditionally concentrated its marketing efforts on its audit area. It was a leading
auditor of manufacturing firms. In contrast, Touche Ross had
concentrated on auditing and consulting in retailing and financial industries. Both firms hoped that a merger would provide
the opportunity for expansion of consulting. Voluntary disclosure by Deloitte & Touche indicated the merger between these
two firms was "considerably closer to a combination of equals'
than the merger of Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young" [Crane,
1990, p. 13]. In fiscal 1989, Touche Ross disclosed accrual earn-
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ings of $245,000 per partner, and Deloitte Haskins & Sells confirmed $241,000 of earnings per partner.
Thus, by 1989 "the Big Eight" had been reduced to "the Big
Six". In fact, it was almost reduced to the "Big Five". In July,
1989 Price Waterhouse and Arthur Andersen announced that
they had begun talks aimed at merging the firms. This merger
would have created the world's largest accounting firm with total revenues approaching $5 billion [Berton, Wall Street Journal,
1 July 1989]. However, almost immediately the differences in
firm culture became problematic. Price Waterhouse had the image of a conservative auditor of "blue chip" companies and had
only recently actively entered the consulting area. On the other
hand, Arthur Andersen had for many years aggressively marketed both its auditing and consulting services. In late September, 1989, talks between Arthur Andersen and Price Waterhouse
broke down and merger plans were terminated [Berton, Wall
Street Journal, 27 September 1989].
As the 1980s ended, major United States accounting firms,
as in the past, were changing in response to the changing environment in which they function. Historically, they have adapted
well. They have grown from small local partnerships to large
international firms that measure their revenues in billions of
dollars. They offer dozens of different services to thousands of
clients. However, as the accounting profession enters the 1990s,
for the first time in over sixty years, the term "Big Eight" accounting firm is no longer appropriate. Now, whether a company is in Japan, England, Italy, or the United States, it can be
audited by one of "the Big Six" firms.
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USING HISTORICAL ANNUAL REPORTS
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BENEFIT THE PRESENT
Abstract: In this article, it is suggested that accounting education may
be enhanced by the use of published historical accounting materials,
such as annual reports. Comparing such materials with modern reports serves to reinforce the notion that accounting evolves in response to environmental change. Further, requiring students to analytically derive cash flow statements from historical published annual
reports provides several direct pedagogical benefits.

Accounting educators have been urged to make their
courses more intellectually appealing to students, and to thus
contribute to education in a broad, liberal sense [Koeppen,
1990]. Critics admonish accounting instructors for ignoring students' cognitive development [Amernic and Beechy, 1984], for
teaching financial accounting as a set of rules and authoritative
pronouncements [Zeff, 1979; Frakes, 1983], and for ignoring the
real environment within which accounting is done [Chambers,
1987; Amernic, 1985]. The purpose of this article is to suggest
that accounting educators may fruitfully draw upon relatively
accessible historical accounting materials as a partial means of
achieving educational goals and dealing with the concerns of
various critics.
With the expansion of accounting's technical body of
knowledge, accounting history has tended to be ignored by accounting educators [see Bloom and Collins, 1988; and Zeff,
1989].1 Zeff [1989, p. 204] asserts that "[a]bove all, a historical
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'Some material emphasizing historical accounting documents in teaching
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perspective is essential" if accounting as a discipline is to contribute to the broadening of the student's intellect, and thus
deserve a place in the university curriculum. He goes on to write
[pp. 204-205]:
. . . When learning a subject, a student's natural curiosity turns to the origins of thought and practice. In this
way, one proceeds from the simpler to the complex,
from the past to the present, establishing relevance and
stimulating interest in the phenomenon under study.
Yet one is unable to find a single financial accounting
textbook — introductory, intermediate, or advanced —
that purports to explain the historical source of
present-day accounting thought or practice.
In a similar vein, Koeppen [1990, p. 89] argues that accounting
graduates may "lack the conceptual and analytical skills needed
for success" at least partly because of "the absence of a sense of
history . . . in the classroom."
The sections which follow offer an example of relatively
accessible historical accounting materials, describe how they
may be integrated into accounting courses using two assignments, and suggest how their inclusion may assist in achieving
various teaching goals. In particular, the differences between
historical and current means of fulfilling corporate accountability are viewed as the result of changes in the legal, social and
economic environments, and the changing power and demands
of users of financial statements.
The specific historical accounting teaching materials employed were the 1924 and 1925 annual reports of Massey-Harris
Company, Limited. This Canadian company evolved into MasseyFerguson Limited (since renamed Varity Corporation), with
about 67,000 employees in the mid-1970s, although recently it
has fallen on hard times [Baldwin and Mason, 1983; Bliss,
1988]. In 1991, it reincorporated as a U.S. company.
Historical annual reports of the larger, more important
companies, while certainly not as easily accessible as current
annual reports, are often accessible with some digging. In the
case of Massey, the company's part-time archivist had ensured
that two copies of the original annual reports were kept at corporate headquarters from 1923 (the first year that the company
published its report) to the present. The older reports from the
1920s were beginning to deteriorate, and the reports had not
been copied to other media (for example, microfiche). The
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authors were permitted to make photocopies of the reports, portions of which are reproduced in the Appendix.
Although private collections (such as Massey's) would appear to be a potentially fruitful source for historical annual reports, public and university libraries also often maintain such
collections. For example, the main reference library of Metropolitan Toronto has a historical collection of annual reports of
public companies whose securities are listed on the Toronto
Stock Exchange. Similarly, the University of Mississippi library
has many collections of annual reports dating back to the early
1900s.
Although annual reports represent a small subset of the "accounts" created by an organization, they are the company's official public documents and thus provide a focus for accountability. Indeed, annual reports may be viewed as mass communication devices [Parker, 1982], a snapshot of top management's
mind-set [Neimark, 1983], a means of obtaining unobtrusive insight into corporate strategy [Bowman, 1976 and 1978], source
material for business historians [Marriner, 1980; Mason, 1982],
as a means of providing an illusion of management control in a
hostile environment [Salancik and Meindl, 1984], etc. Further,
the accounting measurement and disclosure choices revealed in
annual reports may provide insight into the quality of earnings
and thus management's attitudes [Hawkins, 1986; Kochanek
and Norgaard, 1988]. Thus, annual reports and the financial
statements which they contain have the potential for acting as a
variety of traces by which the history of an organization may be
at least partly understood. In turn, the nature and structure of
an organization's annual report may reveal insights into the
type and details of accountability required by the environment.
This importance of the annual report has also resulted in a reawakening in the accounting education literature of the value of
annual reports as a pedagogical device [Harkins and Mills,
1985].
ASSIGNMENT I: COMPARISON OF HISTORICAL
AND MODERN ANNUAL REPORTS
Students in undergraduate Intermediate Accounting were
given the assignment described below. The students' previous
exposure to financial accounting had been in a rather traditional, problem-solving and rule oriented introductory accounting course, so this assignment was an initial attempt at employ-
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ing a historical approach in order to encourage the development
of what Koeppen [1990] terms an "accounting culture". Use of
actual historical materials (i.e., the 1924 and 1925 annual reports) was intended to provide students with assignment material
that they might view as tangible and real, and therefore credible.
The assignment was in two parts, thus contributing to two
sections of the curriculum. In Part I, which was administered at
the beginning of the term, students were provided with the following materials:
— a copy of Massey-Harris Company, Limited's 1925
annual report (see the Appendix), and
— a copy of Varity Corporation's (Massey as it is today)
1990 annual report.
As a homework task, the students were requested to read
the two annual reports, and to identify specific differences and
similarities. Then, the students were to speculate on the reasons
for the differences in the two reports. Examples of student-generated differences are set out in Exhibit 1. During class, the
student-generated material led to stimulating discussions which
had two phases: in phase one, students attempted to compete
with each other in identifying non-trivial differences between
the two reports. Such a discussion served to reinforce the idea
that financial reporting, at least as revealed in these particular
annual reports, had changed considerably over the 65-year period. Having such teaching materials and discussion near the
beginning of intermediate accounting acted as an important
background against which the breadth of the discipline was explored as the course unfolded.
Phase two of the student discussion focused on generating a
list of plausible reasons for the differences in the two reports.
Although appropriate journal articles could have been provided
as preliminary reading, they were not because the objective was
to encourage each student to think seriously about the possible
reasons, and not merely to have them appeal to the authority of
a journal article. Such an approach was effective when followed
up with a class discussion that required students to justify their
possible reasons to their peers and the instructor. Linking the
actual changes between 1925 and 1990 reports (which the students had identified earlier, and around which a consensus had
developed) to reasonably possible reasons for the changes, was
an extremely useful exercise, and was well-liked by the students.
Educators frequently make use of comparison in order to
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introduce or reinforce a concept or point;2 by comparing aspects of the modern report with actual historical examples, both
the evolutionary nature of financial reporting, and the increased
amount and diversity of information now available, are made
clear. Expanding the examples of differences between the 1925
and 1990 reports in Exhibit 1 may be one way to make this
point during class discussion; four of the examples from the
exhibit are expanded below as discussion illustrations:
Item #1 ("Numerous terminology differences") indicates that the labels accountants employ to identify elements of financial statements have changed over time.
The change has been towards greater descriptive accuracy; for example, the historic term "surplus" suggests
an excess, or an amount not needed in the operations
of a business, while the modern term "retained earnings" is more neutral and more precise — it suggests
nothing about the desirability of the organization's dividend policy, but merely serves to indicate that the
amounts in the account have not been distributed.
Item #7 ("Depreciation expense a function of income") indicates that the notion of matching costs
against revenues is a relatively recent concept. In historical financial statements, the depreciation charge
was by and large discretionary, and reflected the perception of management of "what the traffic could
bear". Thus, the process of income measurement, students might conclude, was perhaps more arbitrary in
the 1920s, and did not emphasize the normative goal of
attempting an objective measure of corporate progress.
Item #8 ("No extraordinary items . . . ") suggests that
the "current operating" versus "all-inclusive" views of
income represents a debate that has evolved over many
years in accounting. In 1925, no attempt was made in
the Massey financial statements to identify an operating income number, so the idea that meaningful classification of the components of income is important to
users, is a relatively new concept. Students may be encouraged to discuss why the settlement of the Treaty of
Versailles claim would have characteristics that would
lead modern accountants to classify it as "extraordinary".
Item #15 ("No formal footnotes in the 1925 report")
may be used to illustrate the point that the quantity
2A recent published example of employing comparison is Shank and
Govindarajan [1988].

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol19/iss1/7

42

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1992, Vol. 19, no. 1
34

The Accounting Historians Journal, June 1992

and detail of information in the financial statements
has increased dramatically. That this is a general phenomenon may be supported by reference to a study
such as that by Lanfranconi [1976], which found that
the number of pages devoted to footnotes in the annual
reports of Canadian companies increased tenfold over
the period 1955 to 1974. The fact of the increased
quantity of information (or perhaps more precisely,
data) might not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the information is useful. For example, if "readability"
is one aspect of usefulness, then students may be referred to research such as that of Courtis [1986], which
concluded that the footnotes of a sample of modern
(1983) Canadian annual reports were not readable by
the majority of potential users. Students might then apply standard readability formulas to the 1925 and 1990
Massey/Varity annual reports, for comparison. Classroom discussion of this item from Exhibit 1 could then
conclude by considering the following possibilities:
— must users of modern reports have higher education levels in order for the difficult-to-read footnotes to be understandable?
— must footnotes be written in low readability style?
— could the significant increase in footnote volume
and apparent reading difficulty have led to information overload relative to 1925?
The differences summarized in Exhibit 1 may be linked to a
shift in relative power from corporate management to various
external users of financial reporting. This shift in the environment is evident in modern disclosure regulations and legislation, which reflect evolving public policy. The impact of such a
shift readily becomes evident to students when they compare
financial statements from the 1920s with modern financial
statements.3

3Employing published reports from the 1920s as the "historical" comparison
has several advantages:
— they are often reasonably-accessible, either in libraries or company archives,
— they were prepared during the pre-GAAP/high-regulation era, and thus
provide an interesting contrast to modern reports,
— while they are quite different in detail from modern reports, they are
similar to modern reports in overall structure, and thus might not alienate students by being "too different and thus unintelligible."
— they were issued in an era of reasonably well-established capital markets.
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Exhibit 1
Apparent Differences — Historic (1925)
Versus Modern Annual Reports
1. Numerous terminology differences; for example, "surplus" instead of "retained earnings".
2. No comparatives in 1925 annual report.
3. "Income Account" highly condensed; no details regarding cost of sales, etc.,
in the 1925 report.
4. The balance sheet in the 1925 report appears to have prominence over the
income statement, because of the lack of detail noted above in item #3, the
prominent placing of the balance sheet in the center of the annual report,
and the reference in the auditor's opinion only to the balance sheet.
5. Order of items on both sides of balance sheet reversed from modern practice.
6. Use of a "Contingent account".
7. Depreciation expense a function of income (shareholders' letter for FYE
30th November, 1925 says "The Net Profit .. . was $1,323,462 in excess of
that of 1924. During the year, the Company . . . recovered the sum of
$661,139. Advantage was taken of this recovery to make liberal appropriations for depreciation...").
8. No extraordinary items nor prior period adjustment categories (the settlement of the Treaty of Versailles claim is taken to income).
9. No statement of changes in financial position nor cash-flow statement in
the Massey-Harris Company, Limited 1925 annual report.
10. Explicit mention of working capital improvements (reference to working
capital as "net liquid or working capital") in the 1925 annual report. In
contrast, modern reports have an extensive Management Discussion and
Analysis section.
11. No separate accounting policy note, although some policies are disclosed in
the shareholders' letter.
12. Wording of auditor's report quite different:
— no reference to GAAS or GAAP,
— refers to "the true position of the company",
— focuses on the balance sheet.
13. Subsidiary not consolidated; thus, computation of total group net cash flow
from operations is impossible. Furthermore, subsidiary is not accounted
for using either the equity or cost basis; rather, it is accounted for based
upon the stated value of the shares.
14. Asset contra accounts such as "Reserves and Funds — Buildings and Equipment" (accumulated depreciation) and "Reserves and Funds — Possible
losses on collections" (allowance for doubtful accounts) shown on the equities side of the balance sheet.
15. No formed footnotes in the 1925 annual report.
16. Apparently, expenses related to pensions are discretionary.
17. No deferred taxes.
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ASSIGNMENT II: PREPARATION OF A
CASH-FLOW STATEMENT
Recent changes in generally accepted accounting principles
requiring that companies present cash-flow statements were regarded as quite important and revolutionary during the period
in the 1970s and 1980s when such changes were being debated
[Largay and Stickney, 1980; Nordgren, 1986]. However, such
requirements are no longer novel, and are perceived as merely
another aspect of financial reporting. The importance of classifying cash (rather than accrual) flows (into operating, financing,
and investing categories), and tracking their progress over time,
is no longer as unique as when Largay and Stickney [1980]
criticized accrual accounting information in their analysis of
the W. T. Grant bankruptcy.
That this is a recent phenomenon may be surprising to
some students. Requiring students to prepare a cash-flow statement for 1925 for Massey-Harris Company, Limited, using the
published annual report information for both fiscal 1924 and
1925 (recall that comparatives were not published) serves the
function of indicating to students how much financial reporting
has changed in response to user demands (references to articles
such as Largay and Stickney, 1980, may be used to illustrate the
types of pressures accounting standard-setters were under to
establish cash-flow principles). Students may be further surprised to learn that standard-setters were positively hostile towards operating cash-flow information up until quite recently
(the cash and related approaches were approved in APB #3 and
APB #19 in the United States).
The specific assignment material was provided to students
at the end of a first lecture on the construction and use of cashflow statements. The material included the following:
— the 1924 and 1925 Massey-Harris Company, Limited
annual reports,
— an instruction sheet, which read as follows:
"Varity Corporation is a Canadian multi-national
company, which was previously known as MasseyFerguson Limited. In the mid-1970s it employed
about 67,000 people and was one of Canada's premier corporations. In the early 20th century the corporation was a single-industry firm and was called
the Massey-Harris Company, Limited. Enclosed are
the financial statements and the report of the direc-
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tors of Massey-Harris Company, Limited for the
years 1924 and 1925. You should note that accounting has evolved since the 1920s, both in content and
terminology; accordingly, you may encounter in the
report terms and presentations which differ from the
ones that you are used to.
1. Prepare a cash-flow statement for Massey-Harris
for 1925. The "t-account" method is probably
most efficient and effective here.
2. Analyze the company's 1925 results in relation to
its strategy and environment."
Aside from reinforcing the notion that financial reporting is
evolutionary and responds to its environment (at least sometimes!), the requirement of preparing a "historic" cash-flow
statement has the following specific educational benefits:
1. Students must deduce the nature of an account from
the description of how it works in the annual report
rather than from its location and title, since both
account locations in the financial statements, and
their titles, are different from those in modern
financial statements. An example is the account
"Taxes — Head Office and foreign branches". Although it is classified under "Reserves and Funds", it
is similar to a modern "Income tax payable" account
(current liability). Another example is the so-called
reserve account for "Buildings and equipment",
which must be analyzed in conjunction with the
"Appropriation for depreciation of plants, etc." account in the published "Income Account".
2. Students become sensitive to alternative financial reporting formats, which is important since they likely
will need to be open to accepting foreign financial
statements at some point during their career.
3. Since the teaching material is "real", it has more intrinsic interest for the student than "toy" teaching
material, and thus student commitment is enhanced.
During the 1924-25 period, Massey-Harris Company,
Limited was essentially a single-industry firm and
thus relatively simple to understand, but because of
its international dealings and broad product line, its
annual reports were "rich". Further, even introductory students can see the impact of the uncertainty
of agricultural grain yields and prices on the company.
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4. Successful completion of this task helps ensure that
students understand the double-entry, accrual
model, and can generalize their knowledge to unfamiliar situations. Thus, enhancing the student's tolerance for ambiguity and assisting in cognitive
growth may be benefits here [Amernic and Beechy,
1984].
5. Students can relate both the nature of the financial
statements (e.g., the accounts used, the expenses incurred, etc.) to the nature of the business. They can
also relate the company's results, environment, and
strategy to the financial statement results.
6. Preparing a cash-flow statement, using the indirect
method, from the 1924 and 1925 accounts, requires
students to come to grips with technical issues such
as the treatment of apparently non-operating transactions (the settlement of the Treaty of Versailles
claim) and the impossibility of computing net cash
flow from operations for the consolidated group
when the company neither consolidates its subsidiaries nor discloses their separate financial statements.4
A cash-flow statement for Massey-Harris Company, Limited
for 1925, as prepared by the authors, is shown in Exhibit 2.5
Students might note the following (among other observations)
about the statement:
— net cash flow from operations is about $900,000 less
than reported net income.
— the company's emphasis on controlling current operating asset levels (inventories and accounts receivable) did not generate sufficient cash flow to overcome the cash drain effect of reducing accounts payable.
— the company appears to avoid debt since none appears on the 1925 balance sheet, nor as a financing
cash flow item in Exhibit 2; however, the company is
contingently liable for its unconsolidated subsidiary's debenture note issue. Had a consolidated
cash-flow statement been prepared, the reduction in

4 This observation may be used to support the recent FASB principle requiring across-the-board consolidation of subsidiaries.
5A complete t-account worksheet is available on request from the first author.

Published by eGrove, 1992

47

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 19 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 7
39

Amernic and Elitzur: Using Historical Annual Reports in Teaching
the subsidiary's debt w o u l d have shown up as a financing outflow of cash.
— no dividends were paid, even though 1925 w a s apparently a f a r more successful year than 1924. This,
combined with management's apparent aversion to
debt and the inherent riskiness of the f a r m implement manufacturing and distribution business, suggest a prudent, conservative management.
Exhibit 2
Massey-Harris Company, Limited
Statement of Changes in Financial Position
Y e a r E n d e d N o v e m b e r 30, 1925
(prepared f r o m published annual report data)
( N u m b e r s are rounded)
OPERATIONS —
Net income
Adjustments not requiring working capital —
Foreign exchange provision
Pension provision
Depreciation
Fire indemnity fund
Working capital provided by operations
Adjustments for operating current accounts —
Reduction in inventory
Increase in prepaids
Reduction in accounts receivable
Reduction in allowance for doubtful accounts
Increase in goods supplied to
unconsolidated subsidiary
Reduction in accounts payable
Increase in accrued taxes
NET CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS
INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Purchased factory assets
Purchased branch assets
Acquire additional common stock of
unconsolidated subsidiary
NET CASH FLOW FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES
TOTAL NET CASH FLOW

$1,411,173*
4,942
(5,617)
869,334**
12,275
2,292,107
2,465,333
(675,528)
1,958,452
(298,978)
(370,125)
(4,908,260)
41,644
$

504,645
65,452
255,884
6,538
(327,874)

$ 176,771

* As may be seen from the notes to the 1925 financial statements (Appendix),
$661,139 represented the recovery in cash of assets previously written off due
to the First World War. Most students will argue that this amount should be
classified as "non-operating"; if it is so classified, then "Net Cash Flow from
Operations" is negative.
** Computed from the change in the balance sheet accounts.
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CONCLUSION
In this teaching note, we have suggested introducing teaching materials grounded in "reality" (specifically, historical reality) as a means of enhancing student commitment, and thus
learning, in accounting. Teaching materials from a relativelyneglected area — historical annual reports — were described,
and potential educational benefits were suggested. The use of
materials that reflect the activities of actual people and their
organizations, both past and present, can only serve to enrich
accounting education, and assist in helping students become
more aware of both the diversity and the complexity of the
world that uses the structures, processes, and outputs of accounting. Indeed, Bloom and Collins [1988] have rationalized
the use of a historical perspective in accounting education employing learning theory.
It is not too extreme to suggest that accounting is a social
construction [Hines, 1988], and thus if educators are to assist
students in understanding accounting and its roles in society,
the perspective of the evolution of accounting must be stressed.
Accordingly, teaching approaches which draw upon the use and
analysis of historical accounting materials, as counterpoint to
modern financial statements, may offer educators the opportunity of letting the past benefit the present.
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APPENDIX
MASSEY-HARRIS COMPANY, LIMITED
REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS
for the
YEAR ENDED 30th NOVEMBER, 1924*
To be submitted to the Shareholders at the Annual Meeting, on Wednesday
the 4th February, 1925, at 2.30 p.m.
To the Shareholders:
Your directors have pleasure in presenting the following report of the
operations and affairs of Massey-Harris Company, Limited, and its subsidiary
Companies—Verity Plow Company, Limited, and the Bain Wagon Company,
Limited,—the entire capital stock of both of which Companies is owned by your
Company, for the year ended 30th November, 1924.
Income Account
The Income from the year's operations before deducting
interest and appropriations was

$1,065,180.15

From this there has been deducted:
Interest on borrowings
Appropriation for depreciation of
plants, etc
Appropriation for Pension Fund
Leaving a Net Profit for the year of

$

$667,667.85
282,566.85
27,234.73

977,469.43
87,710.72

Surplus Account
The Surplus at 30th November, 1923, was
Less amount to adjust subsidiary companies'
stock to par
Adding the Net Profit for 1924
The Surplus at 30th November, 1924, was

$750,152.73
19,153.85

$ 730,99
87,710.72
$ 818,709.60

A Net Profit, after making adequate provision for depreciation and possible
losses, has been realized for the first time in four years. Although it is small—
$87,711—it is significant in the light of the previous losses amounting to
$1,456,000 in 1921, $643,000 in 1922, and $409,578 in 1923 (after eliminating
the profit realized from the sale of timber lands, which formed a part of last
year's income). The improvement, therefore, in operating earnings over those of
a year ago is $497,288.
The Assets, which aggregate $39,598,503, have been conservatively valued.
Inventories of raw materials have been taken at cost or replacement value,
whichever is the lower. Finished goods at factories are carried at current factory
cost, likewise those at Branches, but with transfer costs added. Quick or current
assets — inventories, receivables, cash — amount to $28,988,191, and constitute
73 per cent of the total assets. Current liabilities have been reduced by
$2,670,170. The net liquid or working capital is $20,448,377.
*This Appendix contains excerpts of the Annual reports; the type has been reset.
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Capital Assets show a small increase over those of last year. Outlays were made
only for such improved labour-saving machinery as would tend to lower manufacturing costs and better the quality of the product. During the year there was
acquired, on reasonable terms, almost the whole of the balance of the shares of
the Massey-Harris Harvester Co., Inc., Botavia, New York. The shares of this
Company now stand at par in the balance sheet.
Sales, on the whole, were less in value than those of the previous year. In
Canada they were approximately only 60 per cent of those of 1923, while in
other countries a fair increase was shown. Various disturbing factors, including
the adverse economic condition of the farmer, were responsible for the lessened
volume of Canadian trade. There is substantial reason to believe, however, that
the situation has commenced to improve, and that the prospects of both the
home and the overseas agriculturist are distinctly brighter.
Plants, Branch warehouses and other properties, at home and abroad, have
been maintained in a sound state of repair. All expenditure involved in this has
been made a charge of the year's operations. A larger amount than in previous
years has been transferred to reserve for depreciation of buildings, machinery
and other equipment. Adequate insurance is carried on all of the Companies'
properties, materials and goods. On its manufacturing plants, the coverage is
approximately 90 per cent of replacement values.
The Balance Sheet, which accompanies the report, includes the certificate of
the auditors appointed by the shareholders at the last Annual Meeting, Messrs.
Clarkson, Gordon & Dilworth, and Mr. H. L. Gillson. The audit of the European
Branch was conducted by Messrs. Howard, Howes & Company, London; of the
Argentine Branch, by Messrs. Price, Waterhouse, Faller & Company, Buenos
Aires, South America; of the Australasian Branch, by Mr. N. L. A. Mackenzie,
Melbourne; and of the Canadian Branches by Mr. H. L. Gillson, Toronto.
The Past Year, for both the farmer and the implement maker, has been an
unusually trying one. In our report, a year ago, it was stated that, while the
outlook was not entirely clear, it was hoped that a turning point had been
reached. Our expectations, however, were not fully realized at home,
nevertheless it is believed that distinct progress has been made in several of the
countries outside of Canada in which we operate. At the present time the
improved prices for cereals and other farm products have given much
encouragement to the farmer, and it is confidently believed that the year which
we have entered will bring greater prosperity both to the farmer and to his ally,
the implement maker.
During the year, the Directors experienced a severe loss in the death of their
esteemed colleague, Sir Edmund Walker, C.V.O., D.C.L., LL.D., who was a
valued member of the Board for twelve years. The vacancy thus created was
filled by the appointment of Mr. T. A. Russell.
Your Directors desire to express again their sincere appreciation of the interest
and devotion manifested by those in the Companies' service, both at home and
abroad, especially during the last four years which, perhaps, have been the most
difficult and trying in the experience of the organization.
T. BRADSHAW,
General Manager

VINCENT MASSEY,
President

Toronto, January 28th, 1925.
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MASSEY-HARRIS COMPANY, LIMITED, and SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET, 30th NOVEMBER, 1924
ASSETS
Capital Assets
Factories—real estate and equipment—
Toronto, Brantford, Woodstock
and Weston
Branches—real estate, buildings and
equipment
Massey-Harris Harvester Co. Inc. 27,237
shares Common stock
(Cost $2,777,274.34)
Patents

$ 5,706,853.31
2,179,758.03
2,723,700.00
1.00

Current Assets
Inventories of raw materials, goods in process
and finished goods (valued at cost, not
exceeding replacement value)
16,310,256.11
Expenditures including interest and
administration charges on account of
next year's operations
1,249,010.45
Bills and accounts receivable
(accrued interest of approximately
$1,100,000.00 not taken into
account)
10,635,622.97
Massey-Harris Harvester Co., Inc.,
Goods Supplied
507,830.99
Cash on hand and in banks
285,470.38
TOTAL ASSETS
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LIABILITIES
Capital
Common—authorized $25,000,000.00—
Issued and fully paid up

$24,179,800.00

Current Liabilities
Bills and accounts payable

8,539,814.35

Reserves and Funds
Taxes—foreign branches
Foreign exchange, etc
Pensions
Buildings and equipment .. .
Possible losses on collections
Fire indemnity

$ 270,872.62
545,269.65
205,365.42
2,143,663.63
2,025,968.28
489,039.69

Contingent account
(as called for by charters and by-law
of companies)
Profit and loss account
TOTAL LIABILITIES

380,000.00
818,709.60

5,680,179.29

1,198,709.60
$39,598,503.24

CONTINGENT LIABILITIES: — Joint
Debenture Note issue with the MasseyHarris Harvester Company, Inc. (now
reduced to $2,400,000.00) and Bank
loans of that Company guaranteed by
this Company $600,000.00.
VINCENT MASSEY, President
T. BRADSHAW, General Manager
We have examined the Head Office books and accounts of Massey-Harris
Company Limited, The Bain Wagon Company Limited, and Verity Plow
Company Limited, as of 30th November, 1924, and have accepted the returns
from the Branches.
The above figures include the Australasian and Argentine Branch accounts as of
30th June, 1924.
The officials have assured us that the Reserves for possible losses on collections
and for depreciation are sufficient, and that the inventories have been properly
valued, and accepting this we certify that in our opinion the above Balance
Sheet is properly drawn up to show the true position of the combined
Companies at 30th November, 1924, according to the best of our information,
the explanations given to us and as shown by the books of the Companies.
We have obtained all the information and explanations we have required.

Toronto, 28th January, 1925.
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MASSEY-HARRIS COMPANY, Limited
REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS
for the
YEAR ENDED 30th. NOVEMBER, 1925
To be submitted to the Shareholders at the Annual Meeting, on
Monday the 1st February, 1926, at 3 p.m.
To the Shareholders:
Your Directors have pleasure in presenting the following report of the
operations and affairs of Massey-Harris Company, Limited, for the year ended
30th. November, 1925.
Income Account
The Income from the year's operations before
deducting interest and appropriations
was
Recovery, in cash, of assets previously
written off
From this there has been deducted:
Interest on borrowings
Appropriation for depreciation of
plants, etc
Appropriation for Pension Fund
Appropriation for Income Taxes
Leaving a Net Profit for the year of

$2,346,542.70
661,139.30 $3,007,682.00

$ 480,512.84
939,165.16
26,830.69
150,000.00

1,596,508.69
$1,411,173.31

Surplus Account
The Surplus at 30th November, 1924, was
Amount held in Contingent Account of Subsidiary Companies not now required,
as Charters are being surrendered
Adding Net Profit for 1925
The Surplus at 30th November, 1925, was

$ 818,709.60

. 130,000.00 $ 948,709.60
1,411,173.31
$2,359,882.91

The Net Profit of $1,411,173, realized after interest charges, appropriations for
plant depreciation, pension fund, income taxes and other reserves had been
made, was $1,323,462 in excess of that of 1924. During the year, the Company
was successful in its suit, instituted under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles,
against a European power for moneys sequestrated during the war and
recovered the sum of $661,139. Advantage was taken of this recovery to make
liberal appropriations for depreciation and reserves, as will be noted in the
income account. The effect of that action is that the present net asset value of
plant property has been so adjusted that it will amortized well within the
estimated life of each class of such property and that in subsequent years only
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normal reserves and depreciation will be required to be made. The balance at
the credit of Profit and Loss is $2,359,883, or $1,541,173 in excess of what it was
in 1924.
Capital and Current Assets, which in aggregate make up the total of
$36,725,017, have been conservatively valued. Capital assets of $10,938,186 have
been increased within the year by $327,874, due mainly to the purchase of
necessary warehouses and branch properties in South America and Australia,
the acquisition of a factory site in France, and the installation in the Canadian
plants of certain improved labor-saving machinery, tending towards better and
more economical production.
Current Assets, which amount to $25,786,831, or 70 per cent of the whole,
show a decrease for the year of $3,201,359. Inventories, composed of raw
materials, finished goods, and goods in process of manufacture, show a decline
of $1,789,805; while bills and accounts receivable were reduced by $1,958,451.
The usual practice of pricing everything entering into inventories at cost or
replacement value, whichever was the lower and of making adequate provision
for possible losses on receivables was followed.
Current Liabilities, which represent only 14 per cent of current assets, were
reduced by $4,908,259, making the net liquid working capital $22,155,277, or
almost 1¾ millions more than a year ago.
Sales, for the year, were, according to value, 29% in excess of those of 1924,
and, with one exception, exceeded the amount of goods sold in any previous
year. Exports, however, very greatly exceeded Canadian sales, the former being
no less than 62% of the whole. It will be recalled that in the last report your
Directors expressed the opinion that a substantial improvement in conditions at
home was in evidence. This has been justified by the important increase in the
Canadian business during 1925. While the proportion of business done outside
of Canada during the past several years has substantially exceeded the home
business, it is gratifying to record a distinct improvement in the domestic
demand.
For a number of years the Company has been exporting goods to South
Africa through a valued connection, Messrs. R. M. Ross & Company of
Capetown, who still handle our line, but the time appeared to be opportune for
an extension of operations and for the establishment of the Company's own
organization in accordance with its method of carrying on business in other
countries. After a most careful survey of the South African field, it was decided
to open a Branch at Durban. The results already obtained fully justify the action
taken.
Factories, distributing warehouses, and other properties owned by the
Company in Canada and overseas, have been maintained in a sound state of
repair. The whole of the cost involved in connection with this has been treated
as a current expense and charged in the operations of the year. Fire insurance to
the extent of approximately 90% of the replacement value is maintained on
plants, other properties and inventories.
The high standard of workmanship and construction for which the Company's
products has been deservedly noted, has not only been maintained but many
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outstanding improvements have been made in the development of implements,
enabling them to be operated more efficiently in the field, and producing better
results for the farmer. The advance which is steadily being made in agriculture
is in measure due to the improved character of the implements of production
and to the service which the implement manufacturer is rendering to the
farmer.
It has been gradually borne in upon the Directors that, in order to maintain the
Company's important and desirable business in certain parts of Europe, it
would be essential to consider seriously local manufacturing. A small plant,
involving a nominal investment, has been in operation in Germany for several
years. It now gives promise of becoming more important as conditions in that
country improve. During recent years, the necessity of manufacturing in France,
where the Company has an important business and a good sales organization,
has become quite apparent, and as a consequence, and after a further careful
survey of the whole subject, a factory site has been acquired and at present
plans are being prepared and tenders sought with the object of proceeding
promptly with the construction of a factory and the installation of the necessary
manufacturing equipment.
Improved crops, combined with better prices for farm products, at home and
abroad, materially helped to re-establish in 1924 the farmer's economic
position, while the harvest of 1925 with even better prices in many instances,
still further contributed to his welfare, with the result that he is again a
substantial purchaser of needed goods. In Europe those conditions which have a
bearing upon our interests, while still far from normal, have steadily improved,
and there is a justifiable expectation that further advancement in the
establishment of confidence and credit will proceed in 1926 and succeeding
years. On the whole it is believed that not only have the farmer and the
implement manufacturer made substantial progress in re-establishing
themselves on a sound basis, but that the immediate future is promising for
both and for practically all other Canadian industries.
The Balance Sheet, which accompanies the report, includes the certificate of
the auditors appointed by the shareholders at the last Annual Meeting, Messrs.
Clarkson, Gordon & Dilworth, and Mr. H. L. Gillson. The audit of the European
branches was conducted by Messrs. Howard, Howes & Company, London; of
the Argentine Branch, by Messrs. Price, Waterhouse, Faller & Company, Buenos
Aires, South America; of the Australasian Branch, by Mr. N. L. A. Mackenzie,
Melbourne; and of the Canadian Branches by Mr. H. L. Gillson, Toronto.
To fill the vacancies on the Board caused by the resignation of Mr. Vincent
Massey and the death of Mr. Lloyd Harris, Mr. George W. McLaughlin of
Oshawa and Mr. Charles S. Blackwell of Toronto were elected Directors. Mr.
Massey became a Director in 1919 and was made President in December, 1921.
During the whole of the period of his association, his direction, counsel and
advice were much valued and appreciated. Mr. Harris in the early years of the
Company ably represented its interests in Europe and during the past five years
was a valued member of the Board.
The Directors desire to record in no formal manner their deep appreciation of
the zealous, efficient and loyal manner in which those in the Company' service,
both at home and abroad, have performed their duties during the past year, and
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to whom, in no small measure, are the shareholders indebted for the improved
condition of affairs as reflected in the report.
T. BRADSHAW,
General Manager.

JOS. N. SHENSTONE,
President.

Toronto, January 22nd, 1926.

MASSEY-HARRIS COMPANY, Limited
BALANCE SHEET, 30th NOVEMBER, 1925
ASSETS
Capital Assets
Factories—real estate and equipment—
Toronto, Brantford, Woodstock
and Weston
Branches—real estate, buildings and
equipment
Massey-Harris Harvester Co. Inc. 27,361
shares Common stock
(Cost $2,783,812.84)
Patents
1.00

$ 5,772,305.30
2,435,641.81
2,730,238.50
$10,938,186.61

Current Assets
Inventories of raw materials, goods in process
and finished goods (valued at cost, not
exceeding replacement value)
13,844,922.71
Expenditures on account of next year's
manufacturing operations
1,924,538.23
Bills and accounts receivable
(accrued interest of approximately
$880,000.00 not taken into
account)
8,677,171.01
Massey-Harris Harvester Co., Inc.,
Goods Supplied
877,956.40
Cash on hand and in banks .
462,242.69 25,786,831.04
TOTAL ASSETS
$36,725,017.65
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LIABILITIES
Capital
Common—authorized $25,000,000.00—
Issued and fully paid up

$24,179,800.00

Current liabilities
Bills and accounts payable

3,631,554.63

Reserves and Funds
Taxes—Head Office and foreign
branches
Foreign exchange, etc
Pensions
Buildings and equipment .. .
Possible losses on collections
Fire
indemnity

$ 312,517.25
550,211.93
199,748.33
3,012,997.51
1,726,990.19
501,314.90

6,303,780.11

250,000.00
Contingent account—per charter
Profit and loss account
2,359,882.91
2,609,882.91
$36,725,017.65
TOTAL LIABILITIES
CONTINGENT LIABILITIES: — Joint
Debenture Note issue with the MasseyHarris Harvester Company, Inc. (now
reduced to $2,000,000.00) and Bank
Loans of that Company guaranteed by
this Company $485,000.00.
JOS. N. SHENSTONE, President
T. BRADSHAW, General Manager
We have examined the Head Office books and accounts of Massey-Harris
Company Limited, as of 30th November, 1925, and have accepted the returns
from the Branches.
The above figures include the Australasian and Argentine Branch accounts as of
30th June, 1925.
The officials of the Company have assured us that the Reserves for possible
Branch losses on collections and for depreciation are sufficient, and that the
inventories have been properly valued, and accepting this we certify that in our
opinion the above Balance Sheet is properly drawn up to show the true position
of the combined Companies at 30th November, 1925, according to the best of
our information, the explanations given to us and as shown by the books of the
Companies.
We have obtained all the information and explanations we have required.

Toronto, 22nd January, 1926.
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A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE
ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS
Abstract: This study reviews the literature and the practice of accounting for research and development (R&D) costs from the first
reference in 1917 to the current treatment. The conceptual treatment
of R&D is compared to current financial accounting rules and explanation of the evolution of the current rules is presented. The economic and social consequences of the current rules which require
R&D costs to be expressed are examined. The paper explores possible
alternative treatment of R&D costs. As a contrast to U.S. practice, the
accounting treatment of R&D costs in other countries is discussed.
Given the findings of this paper, a strong case can be made for
changing the way that R&D costs are accounted for in the United
States.
In today's rapidly changing world which relies increasingly
on technology, the investments made in research and development ( R & D ) are more critical than ever to the economic future
of companies and countries. The current financial accounting
for R & D costs in the United States is to expense these costs as
incurred. 1 W h i l e this accounting treatment is certainly question1 Attempts have been made by authors such as Higgins (1954) to distinguish
between research costs and development costs:
Development costs are usually thought of as being the costs of
attempting to convert the results of research to a commercial basis.
Since the terms "research" and "development" are often used interchangeably, it is important to distinguish between the two. Research in industry today is usually used in connection with products currently being produced or with new products and is commonly termed "general research." It includes the study of the suitability of materials for specific purposes, the experimental testing
of material, the study of manufacturing processes, and techniques
and similar research work.
Unless otherwise indicated, which is frequently done, R&D costs are considered as a single cost in this paper. Development costs are frequently referred to
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able from a theory standpoint, the expense-as-incurred rule may
have a practical consequence of being a disincentive to firms
making R&D expenditures. Arguably, as a consequence, the current accounting treatment may hinder the United States' economic position in the global marketplace.
In this paper, the history of accounting for research and
development costs is analyzed to determine why the current
accounting rules require immediate expensing. Thus, the evolution of accounting rules is traced from 1917 to the present. The
reporting environment, issues and investigation conducted by
the FASB in 1974 which led to the expense-as-incurred rule is
examined. Particularly significant to the thesis of this paper is
empirical evidence that was available at the time to counter the
FASB's overly pessimistic assessment of the likely outcome of
an R&D expenditure. The paper then reviews the more recent
pronouncement about accounting for software development
costs as a contrast to R&D accounting. Finally the paper examines how other countries account for R&D costs as another contrast to the U.S. practice, despite the similarity to the U.S. accounting problem. Before tracing the historical evolution of the
accounting for research and development costs, the paper examines the importance of R&D and the importance of how R&D
costs are accounted for in the next section of the paper.
OVERVIEW OF THE R&D ISSUE
Clearly, R&D costs are necessary for the survival of many
businesses and are the "engine that drives our economy." Solow
[1957] estimated that 90 percent of the per capita increase in
output between 1909 and 1949 was caused by technological
change. Furthermore, the Committee for Economic Development [Denison, 1962] estimated 36 percent of the increase in
output per worker between 1929 and 1957 was caused by research and development, and only 9 percent by capital intensity.
Technology is even more pivotal in today's world economy.
Thus, the amount of R&D expenditures and how these expendi-

as "applied research" while research with no immediate application is referred
to as "pure research." As is the practice in the United States, the following
generally do not fall under the definition of accounting for R&D costs: research
under contract for others, physical plant for research activities, and costs incurred in the extractive industries.
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tures are accounted have important economic impact on the
future.
In an unpublished study of 182 research intensive corporations, 62 percent of the respondents spent from 25 percent to
350 percent of profits in R&D costs [Nix, 1972]. Unfortunately,
the rate at which U.S. companies are increasing their R&D efforts is declining: "[a] wave of corporate restructuring and a
continuing emphasis on short-term profits are pushing R&D
spending back into the doldrums of the mid-1970s" [R&D
Scoreboard, 1988]. According to the National Science Foundation, the first real decline in R&D expenditures in the past fourteen years occurred in 1989 [Tax Foundation, 1990]. The Industrial Research Institute's Annual R&D Trends Survey indicates
that 1992 will see a slowdown in the growth of industrial R&D
in the United States [November, 1991].
A major Japanese competitive trade advantage over the U.S.
is Japan's heavy emphasis on the process-applied area of R&D
while utilizing advanced technology from the West [Mansfield,
1988]. Although this emphasis on process-applied R&D is not
likely to change in the near future, Japanese firms now seem to
devote about the same percentage of their R&D budget to risky
long-term projects as American firms [Mansfield, 1988]. This
differs significantly from the early 1970s when Japanese industrial R&D was largely characterized by low-risk and short-term
projects [Peck and Tamura, 1976]. Thus, the Japanese are increasingly moving into long-term R&D as the means for creating future innovative products and securing a long-term trade
advantage. U.S. firms may be reluctant to invest in long-term
R&D because of the expense-as-incurred financial reporting
rules. Yet "[corporations in the U.S.A. are beginning to realize
the intellectual property may be their most valuable asset in
competing with Japan" [Dreyfuss, 1987].
The theoretical foundation for the current requirement of
expensing R&D costs as incurred certainly may be questioned.
The accounting model with the annual measurement of income
may be best suited for an agrarian economy characterized by
manual labor and a static technology. However, income may
not be as easily or exactly measured in an industrialized
economy characterized by long-lived capital assets and a rapidly
changing technology. A longer time perspective then the annual
accounting measurement cycle may be required to measure performance of many companies which sell technology based products.
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In regard to the financial treatment of R&D costs, current
practice may be defective in the following respects: (1) matching
of revenue and associated costs often is not achieved, (2) R&D
is a major asset but may not be presented as such, and (3)
disclosure of R&D costs has not kept pace with its increasing
importance. In short, methods used in accounting for R&D
costs may not present a realistic picture of economic consequences of the firm's research and operating activities.
Accounting income is estimated by matching expenses and
revenues over the appropriate time period with cost allocation
being essential to the matching process. In a rapidly changing
technology, however, the useful lives of capital assets become
inordinately difficult to estimate. Technology may render a
plant obsolete many years before it wears out. The lives of many
assets are determined by technological change. Therefore, cost
allocation to determine annual profits becomes even more difficult, yet more important, given a rapidly changing technology.
If capital assets are currently expensed, this allocation distorts
present income even more than capitalization [Thomas, 1969].
Imagine expensing a multimillion dollar plant during construction. Current accounting rules for R&D costs have the same
effect because intangible assets arising from research costs are
expensed in the year they are incurred. As Bierman and Dukes
conclude, "[t]he result of expensing R&D may distort corporate
decision making and lead to faulty measurement of income and
changes in income through time. Business firms do not generally begin new product or process development projects until
the principal technical uncertainties have been resolved"
[Bierman and Dukes, 1975].
A study of 200 companies on the Fortune 500 list suggested
that new ventures need, on average, eight years before they
reach profitability [Biggadike, 1979]. Therefore, it may be that
many R&D expenditures fit the FASB definition of an asset, like
expenditures for capital equipment which are required to be
capitalized. This is to say that R&D expenditures are made with
the expectation of future benefits and are subject to reasonable
measurement. Because R&D costs are incurred to secure future
benefits, expenditures for R&D costs should be capitalized as
assets and allocated to expense in the periods in which they
help generate revenues.
If one accepts the hypothesis that capital markets are efficient in the procuring of information, "[d]isclosure of the

Published by eGrove, 1992

63

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 19 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 7
Nix and Nix: Accounting Treatment of R&D Costs

55

amount of research and development expenditures is an extremely important first step" [Bierman and Dukes, 1975]. As
suggested by Drebin [1966], either cost-allocation procedures or
current market values are preferable to expensing-as-incurred
for reporting R&D costs.
In support of capitalization of R&D costs and the matching
principle, though the timing of benefits from R&D costs is uncertain, an appropriate allocation arguably is better than an immediate write-off. A subjective estimate of the value is better
than an arbitrary write-off to no value [Drebin, 1966]. However,
for such subjective estimates to be an improvement, a considerable amount of attention would have to be given in the development of industry guidelines. An analysis into what type(s) of
R&D should be capitalized and at what stage of completion
R&D should be capitalized would be necessary. Such efforts
could result in a much better matching of these costs and related revenue. Other researchers indicate that the current expense treatment for R&D costs may be in conflict with the
matching principle of financial reporting [Bierman and Dukes,
1975].
Historically, the accounting for R&D costs has ranged from
requiring that all R&D costs be expensed in the year incurred
(generally the current practice in the United States) to that of
deferring and thereby allocating and matching R&D costs to the
periods to which they help generate revenue. Although tax considerations should not be allowed to dictate accounting theory,
the income tax aspects of accounting for R&D have had an impact on the choice of methods used to expense R&D costs. Prior
to 1954, tax law required that the deduction of R&D costs conform to the timing of the reported expense in the financial statements. Therefore, by immediately expensing R&D costs in the
period incurred, the corporation received an immediate writeoff for tax purposes [Raby, 1964]. After 1954, corporations
could get an immediate tax deduction for R&D expenditures
whether expensed or capitalized for financial reporting purposes. Despite the ability to get the deduction irrespective of
accounting treatment, after 1954 most companies continued the
practice of expensing R&D costs for accounting purposes.
Although the choice of methods in financial reporting of
R&D costs is no longer allowed, there seems to be little complaint from management that R&D costs ought to be capitalized
and amortized, rather than expensed. The apparent satisfaction
of management with the current accounting rule of "expense-as-
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incurred" may be due to the fear that if financial accounting
rules allow or require capitalization of R&D costs, the tax rules
might be changed and the immediate write-off for tax purposes
may be lost. The lack of groundswell support by management
for changing the accounting for R&D costs may also be due to
concerns over the problem that could be created if capitalized
R&D costs suddenly must be written-off because the research
proved unproductive, and, as a result, a large loss occurred.
Managers also seem to be concerned that capitalizing R&D
costs may complicate consolidated reporting, especially when
entities with capitalized R&D costs are acquired or disposed.
The satisfaction of corporate management with the expensing of
R&D costs may also be due to the rule giving management the
ability "to manage income" of a given accounting period by cut
ting or accelerating R&D expenditures. Finally, the current
practice of expensing R&D costs may be preferred by management because managers feel that the company currently has the
freedom to extensively disclose (or alternatively not to extensively disclose) in the notes to the financial statements the information that management wants to convey to the investor about
R&D activities.
Given this background about R&D, the problem with the
current accounting treatment and the apparent lack of demand
for change, the history of accounting for R&D costs is traced in
the sections that follow. Exhibit I contains a historical overview
of the major events in R&D accounting. These events are discussed in detail in the sections that follow.
THE HISTORICAL RECORD (1917 TO PRESENT)
A search of accounting literature reveals no reference to
accounting for R&D costs prior to 1917. However, in 1917 the
Federal Reserve Board [Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1917] accepted
R&D as a deferred charge in published financial statements.
The Federal Reserve Board reaffirmed this position in 1929
[Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1929].
At approximately the same time other institutions, such as
the National Association of Cost Accountants, promoted the
same deferral treatment. In the 1924 edition of the National
Association of Cost Accountant's Bulletin, the following statement is found:
It is perfectly proper to carry (the cost of developing a
new article or line) as a deferred account, and an esti-
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Exhibit I
A Historical S u m m a r y of the Financial
A c c o u n t i n g f o r R & D in the U n i t e d States
1917
1924
1926
1929
19201930s
1954
Prior
to 1954
1954
1960s
1964
1972
1975
1985
1985 to
Present

Federal Reserve Board — Deferral supported.
NACA — Deferral supported.
NACA — Deferral reaffirmed.
Federal Reserve Board — Deferral reaffirmed.
IRS — Deferral preferred.
AICPA — Deferral supported only if there is a reasonable connection
to future operations.
Tax law allowed expenditures to be expensed only when the same
procedure was followed in the financial statements.
Tax legislation allows direct write-off regardless of the financial accounting treatment.
Gellein — Disclosure varies considerably.
Raby — Majority of companies expense as incurred because of established practice prior to 1954 tax legislation.
APB No. 22 and SEC No. 125 — Mandatory disclosure in the financial statements and annual 10K report.
SFAS No. 2 (1974) — Direct write-off mandated. Disclosure required.
Expenditures defined.
SFAS No. 86 — Later capitalization and subsequent write-off allowed on computer software expenditures with proven feasibility.
Direct write-off required. Later capitalization and subsequent writeoff allowed on computer software expenditures with proven feasibility. Disclosure varies considerably.

mate should be m a d e to ascertain the number of units
o r volume of sale o r units, as well as an estimate of the
length of time over which this development will b e
spread [1924].
But,
. . . experimenting (covering the current or minor experimenting that is continual in most manufacturing
establishments) should b e charged against current operations each month as the money is expended and assessed against the lines of products affected [1924].
In 1926, the National Association of Cost Accountants again
stated that it w a s acceptable to capitalize the cost of developing
a n e w product (to defer R & D expenses) " . . . if you are starting
out with a n e w product in which you have a very definite knowl-
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edge that there is a field for it, and you are going to spend a lot
of money, and you know it is going to come back to you"
[1926]. At its 1954 annual meeting, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants supported the deferral treatment
only if future benefits were definite: "Development expenses
should be deferred only in those cases where they have a reasonable connection with future operations" [Higgins, 1954].
Thus, accounting organizations had generally supported the deferral treatment for research and development expenditures. It
may be seen, however, that the definition of what could be deferred became, over time, more conservative and restrictive.
Paton [1955] supported the deferral treatment in an accounting
text:
On the other hand, whenever research and related costs
are incurred in substantial amount on a particular
project which is expected to result in a valuable new
process, perhaps patentable, there is much to be said
for deferring followed by systematic absorption in later
years.
Perhaps the most influential institution affecting the accounting treatment of research and development costs has been
the Internal Revenue Service. The Internal Revenue Service tax
policy in the 1920s and 1930s favored the deferral treatment of
research and development costs. From the beginning, early tax
court decisions and accounting literature supported research
and development cost deferral; but scientists and economists
supported immediate deduction for tax purposes as a means to
stimulate research and development.
Businessmen, constantly on the alert for immediate benefits, increased political pressure on Congress to allow the immediate deduction of R&D costs for tax purposes. However, the
tax law prior to 1954 allowed the current expensing of research
and development only when the same procedure was followed
in the financial statement. Thus, before 1954, business firms
may have switched from deferral to current expensing of research and development in published financial statements to
take advantage of the tax benefits of immediate deduction.
In 1954, Congress passed tax legislation which allowed for
the immediate deduction of R&D costs as they were incurred;
these deductions could be taken irrespective of the financial accounting treatment of these costs. Thus there was no longer a
tax requirement that R&D costs be treated for tax purposes ac-
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cording to the treatment on the financial statements. Interestingly, in 1954 Congress merely removed the tax-financial accounting conformity requirement. Congress still permitted the
taxpayer to elect to capitalize and amortize R&D costs for tax
purposes or to deduct these costs as incurred. This tax election
for R&D costs continues today.
The following quotation from the Senate Finance Committee
Report on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 illustrates the intent of Congress in making the tax law change:
No specific treatment is authorized by present law for
research and experimental expenditures. To the extent
that they are ordinary and necessary they are deductible; to the extent that they are capital in nature they
are to be capitalized and amortized over useful life.
Losses are permitted where amounts have been capitalized in connection with abandoned projects, and recovery through amortization is provided where useful life
of these capital items is determinable, as in the case of
a patent. However, where projects are not abandoned
and where a useful life cannot definitely be determined,
taxpayers have had no means of amortizing research
expenditures.
To eliminate uncertainly and to encourage taxpayers to
carry on research and experimentation the House and
your Committee's bill provide that these expenditures,
incurred subsequent to December 31, 1953, may, at the
option of the taxpayer, be treated as deductible expenses. It also provides that a taxpayer may elect to
capitalize such expenditures and if no other means of
amortization is provided, may write them off over a
period of not less than 60 months, beginning with the
month in which benefits are first realized. [Higgins,
1954].
Raby logically asserts that the majority of companies were
probably currently expensing research and development in the
mid-sixties because of income tax law prior to 1954. "Perhaps a
major force underlying this accounting treatment is that before
1954 what was done in the books and financial statements controlled what was allowed to be done on tax returns" [Raby, August 1964]. Furthermore, once this practice was established, it
was continued regardless of the post-1954 tax impact. Raby [August 1964] states, "[a]s a consequence, companies quite logically
set up [the] practice of expensing research expenditures, and
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this practice has continued since, even though tax justification
for doing so has ceased to exist."
Indeed, a survey of 244 companies in the 1960s [Gellein and
Newman, 1973] disclosed that the common practice was to currently expense research and development expenditures. The investigation also revealed 60 percent of the companies disclosed
the dollar amount of research and development in some way,
but only 10 percent disclosed the accounting treatment in published financial statements. Therefore, comparability of financial statements was difficult.
Acceptance of the current expense treatment for research
and development expenditures in accounting practice is revealed in the accounting literature. Braithwaite [1967] said in
an article in Accountancy, "The [British] auditor . . . will take a
jaundiced attitude to any attempt to capitalize research expenditures on the grounds of expected future benefits to the company." Thus, auditors were most comfortable when research
and development costs were expensed; but Braithwaite stated
further, "[t]he auditor . . . may agree that in the long run a
research program necessarily must be judged by its overall fruitfulness." The contradiction in Braithwaite's statements about
current expensing of research and development and future benefits from research and development is obvious.
Auditors have an incentive to support the immediate writeoff of research and development expenditures to avoid unnecessary audit risk. Prior to the SFAS No. 2 [1974] expense requirement, business firms had (and still have) an incentive to capitalize research costs having little future benefit so current earnings
would be more impressive. When it became apparent to the
auditor and to others that these costs had no future benefit,
they were written off. If the write-off caused sharp reduction in
profits and investors saw their investments decline in value, the
auditor might face investor liability suits for being a party to
misleading prior financial statements. Thus, much of the support for expensing R&D costs as incurred came from auditors
who otherwise might face difficulty in evaluating R&D costs.
Prior to SFAS No. 2 [1974], four basic questions regarding
the official accounting treatment of R&D in financial statements
remained unanswered: (1) What activities should be included in
R&D? (2) What portion, if any, of the costs related to these R&D
activities should be deferred? (3) How should these deferred
costs be amortized? (4) How should R&D be disclosed in the
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financial statements? These unanswered questions made the
comparability of R&D information between companies and, for
a company, between years very difficult. Also, these questions
made current and future financial accounting for R&D very difficult.
Prior to SFAS No. 2, R&D expenditures were sometimes
classified as separate expenses on the income statement. Some
companies included R&D expenses with other expenses, yet
other companies included R&D in the cost of goods sold. Also,
management had the flexibility of either currently expensing
R&D or capitalizing R&D and writing it off over future time
periods. Large write-offs of capitalized R&D costs would occur
unexpectedly when it became apparent that the expenditures no
longer had a future benefit. The variety of accounting treatments of R&D costs led to criticism over the lack of uniform
accounting.
Because of criticism over the variety of methods of accounting for R&D, action was taken by the Accounting Principles
Board (APB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in 1972. The APB Opinion No. 22 [1972] made the disclosure of R&D expenditures in financial statements mandatory.
Also, the SEC required the reporting of R&D in the Annual 10-K
Report. Although badly needed, the disclosure requirements of
the APB and the SEC did not solve the problem of the "proper"
accounting treatment for R&D costs in financial reporting.
However, these disclosures made apparent to financial statement users the significance of R&D expenditures in relationship
to accounting measurements.
A BRIEF SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF SFAS NO. 2,
ACCOUNTING FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS
As of January 1975, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) required the expensing of all R&D expenditures
during the year incurred. The two exceptions to this rule are (1)
R&D under contract for others, and (2) plant and equipment
(an R&D lab) which has alternative future uses. A further exception was made by the SFAS No. 86 [1985] for the capitalization
of computer software for which technological feasibility has
been established.
In SFAS No. 2, FASB recognized the problems associated
with the accounting for R&D costs. However, the FASB did an
inadequate amount of research on the problem before making
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its decision in 1974: "[t]he FASB did not undertake a major
research effort for the project. The FASB staff interviewed a
limited number of selected financial analysts and commercial
bankers and reviewed a substantial number of published financial statements" [SFAS No. 2, Para. 20, 1974]. Consequently, the
effect of the current expense treatment on the total dollar
amount of R&D was not carefully considered. Thus, the now
established practice of currently expensing R&D costs may not
be appropriate for all investments or business firms. The current expense-as-incurred practice may well have reduced R&D
costs in total and caused a shift from "pure" to "applied" R&D.
The need to maintain current reported profits and earnings per
share may have resulted in a change in type and amount of
R&D expenditures.
The major objectives of the Statement were (1) to provide
more uniformity in accounting reporting for R&D; and (2) to
provide useful financial information about R&D. FASB Statement No. 2 defines R&D activities, identifies costs associated
with these activities, and specifies the accounting treatment and
disclosure of these costs. It specifically excludes certain activities found only in the extractive industries, but includes R&D in
other industries.
In Statement No. 2, FASB discussed four alternatives in
accounting for R&D. These four alternatives are:
1. Charge all costs to expense when incurred;
2. Capitalize all costs when incurred;
3. Capitalize costs when incurred if specified conditions are fulfilled and charge all other costs to expense;
4. Accumulate all costs in a special category until the
existence of future benefits can be determined [SFAS
No. 2, 1974].
Accounting theory supports alternative three, which is to:
. . . capitalize costs when incurred if specified conditions are fulfilled and charge all other costs to expense"
[SFAS No. 2, 1974]. Consequently, when research and
development expenditures are expected to benefit future time periods, they should be capitalized and amortized over the periods benefited. This capitalization and
future write-off is consistent with the matching concept
as defined by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board. The pronouncement refers to matching as,
"identifying, measuring, and relating revenues and ex-
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penses of an enterprise for an accounting period"
[FASB, 1974].
However, the FASB still chose the first alternative which is,
. . charge all costs to expense when incurred" [1974]. As support for this decision, the FASB utilized research studies that
emphasized a high failure rate for R&D. For example,
one study of a number of industries found that an average of
less than 2 percent of new product development projects were
commercially successful" [Higgins, 1954]. Another study estimated exceedingly high new product failure rates, ranging from
30 to 90 percent. In all likelihood, these studies were not and
are not representative of typical research and development
projects. Other studies indicated more optimistic results.
Mansfield [May, 1972] found more than 75 percent of the
projects he examined had estimated probabilities of success of
80 percent or greater. Forty-four percent of these projects were
technically successful, and only 16 percent were technically unsuccessful. Scherer [1970] attributes this high success ratio to
the fact that ". . . business firms do not, as a rule, begin new
product or process development until the principle technical
difficulties have been whittled down through inexpensive research, conducted either by their own personnel or by outsiders." Thus, R&D success is much higher than inferred in the
Board's decision.
The FASB [1974] also states, " . . . a direct relationship between R&D and specific future revenue generally has not been
demonstrated." However, as previously stated, many projects
are successful and future revenue is directly related to them.
Numerous studies [Minasian, May 1969] have been undertaken
to show this relationship; they have had some success in linking
R&D activity with future revenue amounts, even though the
studies encountered data problems. Most of these studies use
the number of patents or number of employees as statistical
data, rather than the dollar value spent on R&D. Additional
study of the outcomes of research, with actual R&D expenditure
data, may prove enlightening to accounting rule makers.
The FASB [1974] indicated, ". . . at the time most R&D
costs are incurred, the future benefits are, at the most, uncertain." This statement implies there is no economic resource creation. If no future benefits are generated, it would certainly be
irrational for a firm to undertake an R&D project. However,
many studies show the marginal rate of return on R&D is either
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comparable to or greater than investment return on the capital
expenditures. Denison [1962] calculated the rate of return on
R&D to be about the same as for plant and equipment expenditures, but he assumed no time lag. The return rate for R&D
investment would have been much greater with a time lag.
Grilich [1964] found the rate of return for investment in agricultural research to be between 35 and 170 percent. More specifically, Mansfield [May 1972] estimates the marginal rate of return on R&D in the petroleum industry to be over 40 percent,
while in the chemical industry, Minasian [May 1969] estimates
a 50 percent marginal rate of return on R&D.
Referring to the total economy, Fellner [1970] estimates the
rate of return on R&D to be in excess of 18 percent. Assuming a
static technology, 18 percent is much greater than the marginal
rate of return from plant and equipment. Consequently, contrary to the FASB opinion, there was tangible evidence of resource generation at the time of the R&D expenditure. Perhaps
a final irony can be found in the following statement from the
FASB. R&D should not be capitalized even when future benefits
are known simply because they " . . . cannot be measured with a
reasonable degree of accuracy . . ." [SFAS No. 2, 1974]. Following this reasoning, fixed assets, such as plant and equipment,
would not be capitalized because the future productivity of
fixed assets is subject to uncertain marketing conditions and
rapid technology change. Who can estimate accurately the business life of fixed assets? For example, nuclear power plants may
be closed on a moment's notice. Under the same rationale,
"goodwill" in a purchase of a business would never be shown
on the balance sheet and the intangible drilling cost of a "wildcat" oil well, whether "wet" or "dry" can never be an asset. Thus,
in comparison to other costs that are capitalized, R&D costs do
not seem to be of any greater uncertainty or risk.
Given the reasoning behind the FASB's decision, it may be
concluded that SFAS No. 2 had, at best, a questionable theoretical foundation in support for its treatment of R&D costs.
THE HISTORICAL RECORD FOLLOWING THE
1974 ENACTMENT OF SFAS NO. 2
A considerable amount of financial accounting research
was conducted subsequent to the 1974 issuance of SFAS No. 2
to determine the impact, if any, of the expense-as-incurred requirement on R&D expenditures. A central thrust of this re-

Published by eGrove, 1992

73

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 19 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Nix and Nix: Accounting Treatment of R&D Costs

65

search concerned whether the expense-as-incurred rule might
result in decreased corporate spending on R&D in order to
maintain profit levels.
The contradictory findings of much of this research were
published in a special supplement to the 1980 Journal of Accounting Research. Horwitz and Kolodny [1980] concluded that
the rule did, in some cases, reduce R&D expenditure. "We conclude that the evidence supports the premise that the expense
only rule caused a relative decline in R&D outlays for small high
technology firms which had primarily used the deferred method
of measurement."
Other researchers such as Dukes, Dyckman and Elliott
[1980] concluded that SFAS No. 2 did not have any effect on
R&D expenditures: "all three sets of tests fail to support an effect on research and development expenditures attributable to
SFAS No. 2." Wolfson [1980] notes that Horwitz and Kolodny
provided " . . . no evidence of market inefficiencies occurring as
a result of SFAS No. 2." Vigeland [1981] reports that ". . . no
market reaction was observed." In other words, lacking evidence
to the contrary, we must conclude investors are aware of the
impact of SFAS No. 2 on reported earnings. This suggests that
the price of a company's stock would not decrease in response
to the effect of SFAS No. 2 on reported earnings, and the company would not be motivated to reduce R&D expenditures as a
result of the rule.
Most researchers would probably agree that we do not understand the R&D decision making process. Authors such as
Ball [1980] state there is an almost complete absence of theory
on the determination of R&D expenditure and accounting
policy choice. Marshall [1980] states, "[t]he process of determining R&D expenditures, including the choice and role of accounting method is so complex that designs such as those used by
Dukes, et. al., and Horwitz and Kolodny are incapable of producing creditable results." If nothing else, the research of the
late 1970s has forced us to acknowledge we may draw no firm
conclusions in regard to the impact of SFAS No. 2 on R&D
expenditures.
Although additional research was conducted in the 1980s
regarding the impact of SFAS No. 2, few, if any, conclusive findings were made. In 1984, Elliott, Richardson, Dyckman and
Dukes attempted to reconcile the results of the 1980 Horwitz
and Kolodny study with their study [1980] which did not show a
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SFAS No. 2 effect. The results of the 1984 study were again
inconclusive. Interestingly, this study did show a relative decline
in R&D expenditures prior to the 1974 issuance of SFAS No. 2.
Elliott, Richardson, Dyckman and Duke [1984] suggest that we
cannot conclude that SFAS No. 2 caused changes in R&D expenditures. In a 1984 investigation of managers' adoptions to
SFAS No. 2, Selto and Clouse also found inconclusive results in
regard to the effect of the FASB mandated expensing of R&D
requirement. However, Daley and Vigeland [1983] observed that
" . . . R&D capitalizing firms were more highly levered, employed
more public debt, and had a higher ratio of dividends to unrestricted retained earnings, and were smaller in size than R&D
expensing firms." This finding hints that the FASB requirement
had an economic impact on these smaller R&D firms.
A 1987 study of R&D management and corporate financial
policy by Guerard, Bean and Andrews analyzed the relationship
of R&D investment, dividends and new debt financing decisions. Not surprisingly, they found significant relationships
among these variables. They concluded that changes in these
variables occurred simultaneously and could not be considered
independently. In regard to the effect of SFAS No. 2, the efficient market hypothesis that stock prices reported the impact of
R&D expenditures whether they were capitalized or not was
neither confirmed nor denied.
Horwitz and Normolle examined the effect that SFAS No. 2
had on small technology firms in securing R&D awards from
federal agencies [1989]. The study explored whether the detrimental effect of the expense-as-incurred requirement on small
firms' financial ratios might make the firms ineligible for governmental R&D contracts. As a result of SFAS No. 2, the financial ratios of these companies were negatively affected, but no
evidence was found that the expensing requirement reduced the
amount of R&D awards by federal agencies to small research
intensive companies.
DISCLOSURE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
EXPENDITURES CURRENT PRACTICE
Disclosure of R&D expenditures is, today, not unlike that
existing prior to 1975 when SFAS No. 2 was implemented. Corporations, in their annual reports, display a wide variety of information regarding R&D expenditures. Some companies provide no disclosure, others offer considerable detail. The annual
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dollar amount of R&D by year is often separately disclosed on
comparative income statements. Occasionally, either in the
notes or in management's discussion of corporate activities, information is provided for R&D such as percentage of operating
revenue, percentage change from the previous year, number of
full-time R&D employees, and directions the R&D effort is taking. It appears that management of these companies disclose
what they want with regard to the firm's R&D activities.
Although companies are required to expense R&D costs in
the year incurred, there is still considerable latitude in what
management discloses to investors. It seems that companies in
which R&D activities reflect favorably upon them take ample
opportunity to disclose such; other companies for various reasons provide little or no information regarding their R&D efforts. Thus, irrespective of the required current expensing of
R&D, stockholders are frequently not well informed about R&D
efforts.
A BRIEF SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF SFAS NO. 86
ACCOUNTING FOR THE COSTS OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
TO BE SOLD, LEASED OR OTHERWISE MARKETED
The costs of developing computer software that is to be
marketed are similar to R&D costs. In both cases, the costs are
mainly salaries of personnel who are engaged in the projects.
Software development costs and R&D costs are also somewhat
similar as to uncertainty of outcomes, (risks and revenue
amounts) and as to long periods of time between expenditures
and sales. Given these similarities, it is interesting to note the
contrast in accounting for the costs related to developing computer software of software vendors to costs of R&D of a drug
manufacturer, biotechnology firm or even to the R&D costs of a
computer hardware manufacturer.
Before the issuance of SFAS No. 86 in 1985, the financial
statements of computer software companies provided inadequate disclosure about software development costs, and comparisons between companies in the industry were hampered by
the variety of accounting practices for software development
costs. Thus, the latter problem was very similar to the R&D cost
situation prior to SFAS No. 2, while the former problem is still
unresolved with regard to R&D today.
SFAS No. 86 [1985] addressed the issue of whether software
producers should expense development costs as they are in-
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curred or capitalize them on the theory that the cost is creating
a productive asset. The potential impact of this issue is reflected
in the fact that the computer software industry spent $7 billion
in 1985 [Chakravarty and Kolseka]. SFAS No. 86 requires software producers to expense development costs while the product
is still in the R&D phase; but as soon as the product is "technologically feasible," companies must capitalize any further development costs and amortize them over the life of the product,
The practical problem in applying this statement is determining
at what point in time a product becomes technologically feasible. This is particularly a complex problem in the case of computer software which is often redesigned.
SFAS No. 86's treatment of software development costs follows the conceptual definition of an asset in financial accounting: an asset is a cost which benefits a future accounting period.
However, the Statement did not resolve the problem of the lack
of inter-company comparability of financial statements. For instance, in 1984 IBM capitalized 67 percent of its investment in
software products while other companies reported capitalizing
between 3 to 25 percent of their software development costs
[Chakravarty and Koselka]. Thus it appears that SFAS No. 86
may not accomplish its intended purposes of providing better
disclosure and making software companies' financial statements
more comparable. The practical effect of the statement was to
allow software companies to determine when a product's asset
life begins. The software firm must make this critical accounting decision to determine what costs to capitalize for each software development project. As a result, there is still difficulty in
comparing companies within the industry from their financial
statements.
The experience with capitalization of software development
costs is instructive if changes to the accounting for R&D costs
are ever considered. Even though being more conceptually correct, the capitalization of R&D costs will not automatically produce pragmatic improvement. Indeed, less comparability between companies financial statements could result. If capitalization of R&D costs became the financial accounting rule, there
would probably be a requirement that a project reach "technological feasibility" before costs could be capitalized. Again, like
the experience with software development costs, such a vague
rule causes a wide range of interpretations and could cause the
problem of lack of comparability of financial statements be-
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tween R&D firms as well. Thus it is important, if changes to the
accounting for R&D are made to allow capitalization of costs,
that classification criteria be set forth as well to specify precisely when capitalization would begin in an R&D project.
THE HISTORICAL RECORD OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
FOR R&D COSTS IN OTHER SELECTED COUNTRIES
In other English-speaking nations, i.e., Australia, Canada,
Great Britain, Ireland, etc., the capitalization of at least some
R&D costs is permitted. This practice usually has caused a
myriad of problems in defining research development and various types of research such as pure research versus applied. As
with the "technologically feasible" U.S. requirement for software
development costs, these distinctions are important to determine which costs are capitalized from those that are expensed.
As with the U.S. software costs, interpreting the rules and applying the distinctions can vary from company to company. Thus,
accounting for R&D costs, even within one country, can vary
considerably. As will be examined in this section, there is great
variation and problems with the accounting treatment around
the globe.
In 1983, the Australian accounting profession issued the
standard "Accounting for Research and Development Costs"
(AAS No. 13). The objectives of the standard were similar to
those of SFAS No. 2 issued in 1974: to provide useful information regarding R&D costs and to reduce the number of alternative accounting practices for R&D expenditures [Carnegie and
Turner, 1983].
Attempts were made in AAS No. 13 to distinguish between
research and development costs and between basic and applied
research. The definitions, not surprisingly, were difficult to
work with as observed in the following passage taken from AAS
No. 13:
4(a) Research means planned investigation undertaken
with the hope of gaining new scientific or technical
knowledge and understanding which will be useful in
developing a new product or service (hereinafter product), or a new process or technique (hereinafter process), or in bringing about a significant improvement to
an existing product or process.
4(b) Development means the translation of research
findings or other knowledge into a plan or design for a
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new product or process or for a significant improvement to an existing product or process.
AAS No. 13 further divided research into basic research and
applied research. Basic research was defined as ". . . original
investigation directed primarily towards the advancement of
knowledge," while applied research was defined as
. . original
investigation directed primarily towards solving recognized
practical problems." This distinction was made to assist the
practitioner in evaluating the classification of specific costs.
From these definitions, it appears distinguishing between development costs and applied research costs is an enigmatic chore.
AAS No. 13 allows "selective capitalization" in accounting
for R&D costs; that is, some R&D costs may be capitalized or
expensed in the period incurred while others must be currently
expensed. In general, both applied research and development
costs could be capitalized. Basic or pure research is required to
be expensed in the period incurred. Although the theory behind
AAS No. 13 is sound, the practical difficulties in defining and
distinguishing between research costs (pure and applied) and
development costs limit the usefulness of the approach.
In Canada, there is a very basic difference between Canadian and United States' accounting rules for R&D costs; in
Canada development costs should be deferred to future periods
if all of the following criteria are satisfied:
(a) the product or process is clearly defined and the
costs attributable thereto can be identified;
(b) the technical feasibility of the product or process
has been established;
(c) the management of the enterprise has indicated its
intention to produce and market, or use, the product or process;
(d) the future market for the product or process is
clearly defined or, if it is to be used internally
rather than sold, its usefulness to the enterprise has
been established; and
(e) adequate resources exist, or are expected to be
available, to complete the project. (CICA Handbook,
Aug. 1978).
By contrast, development costs in the United States must be
expensed in the period incurred.
In Great Britain, the accounting profession has taken the
position that both pure and applied research should be expensed in the period incurred [SSAP No. 13 revised, Jan. 1989].
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However, the British Accounting rules distinguish the development of new products and services from pure and applied research; these development costs, under certain circumstances,
should be deferred. It is the authors' opinion these distinctions
(which possess the same difficulties as those used in Australia)
are very difficult to define and utilize.
The reasoning behind the British requirements of expensing
pure and applied research is that these costs are regarded as
part of continuing operations required to maintain a company's
competitive position. Therefore, these costs cannot be placed on
the balance sheet as assets, but should be expensed in the period incurred. Also required is a significant amount of disclosure about the R&D activities of the period. If development
costs meet the rigid criteria specified in SSAP No. 13, they are
defined as intangible assets for balance sheet purposes and are
amortized as expense in revenue generation or written off immediately if found to be worthless.
The International Accounting Standards Committee takes
the position that research and development costs should usually
be charged to expense in the period in which they are incurred
[1980]. However, notes the Committee, ". . . if it can be demonstrated that the product or process is technically and commercially feasible and that the enterprise has adequate resources to
enable the product or process to be marketed—it may be appropriate to defer the costs of development activities to future periods."
It can be seen that the United States and other nations
share the difficulty of accounting for R&D costs. Despite problems of implementation and lack of comparability of financial
statements in some cases, other nations are more sophisticated
in distinguishing between types and stages of R&D. These countries specify accounting treatment according to the type of R&D
costs. Perhaps, U.S. accounting should consider adopting some
of the approaches used in these countries.
SUMMARY
Since research and development expenditures are significant in amount, the historical accounting treatment of this important cost was investigated. Historical research reveals that
accounting organizations, the Internal Revenue Service, and accounting practice originally supported capitalization and future
amortization of R&D expenditures. However, economic and so-
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cial forces exerted pressure for immediate write-off of R&D
costs because of the income tax advantage.
The Internal Revenue Service yielded to these forces but
required that R&D costs be currently expensed in published financial statements when immediate write-off for tax purposes
was to be allowed. This tax requirement was reversed in 1954,
but the current expensing technique had already become institutionalized into financial accounting.
Auditors who examined published financial statements supported the established practice of currently expensing research
and development costs. The difficulty in measuring future benefits of the expenditures and the lack of tangible, physical evidence were the main reasons given for this support. Also, management was reluctant to adopt accounting treatment that could
result in an unexpected immediate write-off of R&D "assets"
when deemed to have no future value.
In 1974, the FASB issued Statement No. 2 which required
that private research and development expenditures be currently expensed. The troublesome problem of whether to capitalize or to expense R&D costs was temporarily solved. No more
would the write-offs of past capitalized R&D costs cause drastic
declines in current income and in the stock price.
SFAS No. 2 was pragmatically designed to temporarily
handle the current problem of a lack of uniformity between
companies in accounting for R&D costs. Uniformity in the accounting for R&D costs was established by simply requiring all
firms to expense R&D in the year incurred. Thus, unlike the
treatment of other types of costs, R&D costs are arbitrarily expensed despite the fact that R&D meets the classic definition of
an asset for the "future benefit" inherent in such expenditures.
Also, apparently little analysis was undertaken by the FASB either to consider the success rate of R&D expenditures or to
consider the effect established practice would have on the dollar
amount and on the type of private research and development in
the United States. Nor was a close analysis undertaken by the
Board to determine to what extent research and development
might become a function of current profits as a result of the
current expense treatment. In accounting research conducted
since the issuance of SFAS No. 2 the impact of the requirement
to immediately expense R&D costs on the amount of R&D expenditures has been inconclusive. However, pressure is building
for more adequate disclosure of R&D costs and toward some
change in U.S. accounting rules to allow the capitalization of
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some costs as permitted in numerous foreign nations and,
within the U.S., as permitted for software development costs.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
In more and more industries, research and development is
becoming the dominant asset. The accounting rules have not
kept pace with adequately disclosing and capitalizing this cost.
It is in both the investor's interest (in terms of rational decision
making) and the accounting profession's (in terms of responsibility to society and reputation) to reconsider the accounting for
R&D costs on the financial statements and the amount of detail
disclosed in notes to the statements.
Corporate reporting of R&D can be improved in two ways:
by disclosing more information about R&D spending and activities and by recognizing probable successful development expenditures as an asset that will give future benefits. The difficulties
encountered in determining at what point in time R&D costs
become an asset must be adequately addressed. This has not yet
been done. By contrast, in spite of the difficulties encountered
with SFAS No. 86, accounting rules do allow software development costs to be capitalized at some point in the development.
Arguably, accounting should afford R&D costs similar treatment.
In contrast to the United States, a number of foreign nations allow the deferment of at least some R&D costs, although
many definitional problems of research, pure research, applied
research, and development costs are encountered.
More research is needed in the classification of R&D costs.
Fortunately, a current study by the AICPA's Accounting Standards Executive Committee concerning the classification, capitalization and amortization of advertising costs clearly has implications for the accounting treatment of R&D costs [Flesher,
1979; also, Thompson, Hoskins, and Flesher, 1991]. This is especially true because advertising costs may be even more difficult to match with future revenue. Both R&D and advertising
costs are "intangible" in nature, are material in amount and
benefit future time periods. The expensing of either of these
costs in the period incurred frequently violates the matching
principle of accounting and distorts reported net income.
Flesher explores the " . . . possibility of integrating qualitative
marketing department information with that of accounting."
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Similar research which integrates qualitative R&D department
information with that of accounting may be appropriate. Also, a
comprehensive study of foreign countries' economic treatment
of R&D costs may be useful.
One financial accounting alternative for R&D costs currently being investigated is to classify R&D costs as a contra
stockholders' equity account when incurred rather than expensing in the period incurred. This approach would eliminate the
problem of calling R&D costs an asset and also would eliminate
the negative effect on current net income presently experienced
from expensing R&D costs when incurred. Another approach to
be considered would be the capitalization of R&D costs in an
account similar to organization costs and written off over a definite future time period regardless of revenue generation and
recognition.
Alternatively, accounting rule makers also should consider
expensing general research costs and capitalization of those
costs related to specific projects. These capitalized costs could
be then matched with the future revenue of the project, unless
the project's revenues prove too small to recover these capitalized costs which would lead to the write-off of the remaining
capitalized costs of the project [Milburn, 1968]. Milburn defines
general research as ". . . research of indirect benefit to the future and its contribution cannot be related to specific future
periods on a reasonable basis . . . and . . . specific development,
if successful, as identifiable with specific future benefits."
Milburn cites as support for his view APB No. 11, paragraph
14d, Accounting for Income Taxes, which follows:
Costs identifiable with future revenue or otherwise
identifiable with future time periods should be deferred
to those future periods. When a cost cannot be related
to future revenues or to future periods on some basis
other than revenues, or it cannot reasonably be expected to be recovered from future revenues, it becomes, by necessity, a cost or an expense of the current
period (or in some cases of a prior period).
The impact of SFAS No. 86, (accounting for the costs of
computer software) on R&D expenditures in total amount and
type offers a fruitful area for future research. Difficulties encountered in implementing the standard and how companies
and investors have reacted to it should prove interesting. Also,
the appropriateness of the selective capitalization of R&D in
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specific industries, such as the drug industry, merits investigation. Furthermore, the impact of SFAS No. 2 on small developing companies should be researched in depth. Although this article has dealt primarily with the financial reporting of R&D
expenditures, the tax aspects of this subject merit further research. For instance, to what extent is the United States performing R&D overseas due to the tax advantages of foreign
countries?
Accounting research into the feasibility and appropriateness of capitalization and amortization of advertising costs
clearly has implications for the financial accounting treatment
of R&D costs, especially since advertising costs are perhaps
more difficult to match with future revenue than are R&D costs.
The direct costing approach in which only variable R&D costs
would be capitalized and expensed over future time periods deserves further consideration. Given the historical controversy
regarding the financial accounting of R&D costs, accounting
researchers and policy makers should focus carefully on the impact of the current accounting rules and analyze alternative accounting treatments.
In conclusion, the current requirement [SFAS No. 2] of expensing R&D costs as incurred for financial statement purposes
is inappropriate. R&D costs are material in amount, benefit future time periods, and should more clearly be matched with
(charged to) the revenues they help generate. They also clearly
fit the FASB definition of an asset. It is likely that corporations'
fear of losing the R&D tax shelter and the loss of flexibility in
managing reported profits via the timing of R&D expenditures
are major obstacles to change in existing financial reporting
requirements. However, a change in the financial reporting of
these expenditures is in order.
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1991 ACCOUNTING HALL
OF FAME INDUCTION:
RAYMOND J. CHAMBERS
INTRODUCTION
by
Murray Wells
Board of Nominations
Chairman and Professor, University of Sydney
I first joined the Department of Accounting at the University of Sydney in 1967 and have remained a colleague and
friend of Ray Chambers ever since. Indeed, it has been a rare
privilege, not only to stay in the same university for nearly 25
years, but to work with Ray throughout that period.
During the 1970s and into the 1980s, the University of
Sydney experienced one of those unusual occurrences in Universities, there emerged a genuine community of scholars. Ray's
masterpiece, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior
(and it is a masterpiece), had been published in 1966 and his
stream of journal articles, reports and monographs gathered
pace. His ideas were introduced into the undergraduate as well
as the postgraduate teaching. They were exciting, vibrant times,
and they led to the emergence of the Chambers School of
Thought.
To the outside world, that School epitomized the arguments
for using market selling prices in financial reporting. That was,
of course, a key element — an unavoidable conclusion of Chambers' Theory. All of us then, and most of us still, believed in the
need for a financial accounting system based on market selling
prices. But what Ray's work stood for, above all, was rigor. His
papers and books still stand for all time as classic examples of
tightly reasoned, rigorous, logical expositions. And that, above
all, is his contribution to accounting.
Not as well recognized, but just as important, is another
feature of Ray's contribution, its breadth. We tend to think of
Ray in terms of the advocacy of market selling prices, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior, or CoCoA. But the re-
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cent publication by Garland of Ray's collected works, covering
five volumes, gives an entirely different impression. There we
can see Ray's understanding of, and experimentation with,
many ideas that enjoy much greater popularity today. I am sure
he would not want to claim responsibility for much of what
passes for research in accounting today. But his writings do
embody such ideas as the firm as a nexus of competing demands (or "contracts" in today's language), of the effect of information on the stock market, on the use and abuse of language,
the self-protection of practitioners, the impossibility of auditing
conventional numbers and many other topics now common in
the accounting literature.
The other extraordinary feature of Ray's career was his continued relationship with the accounting profession. Throughout
the whole of time that he was criticizing, cajoling and persuading the profession to do better, he remained an active player in
professional affairs, culminating in his election to President of
the Australian Society of Accountants, one of the largest accounting bodies in the world.
Some time after his term of office, one of Ray's successors
in the Presidency of the Australian Society of CPAs (as it is now)
told me that the Society's motto, which is simply "Integrity",
was never better personified than in the form of Ray Chambers
during his period of service to the Society.
Colleagues, few things have given me more pleasure and I
have had no greater honor than to be invited to induct Ray
Chambers into the Accounting Hall of Fame. Not many of us
have the opportunity to honor our mentors in so tangible a
form. I am therefore immensely grateful to the faculty at Ohio
State for inviting me to carry out this task and I have great
pleasure in reading the formal citations for Raymond John
Chambers.
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INDUCTION CITATION
by
Daniel L. Jensen
Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting
Department of Accounting and Management
Information Systems
College of Business, The Ohio State University
Among the most accomplished and respected accounting
academicians in the world, he lists his recreations as "reading,
writing and arithmetic". A voracious reader with a formidable
vocabulary, he has even been known to study the dictionary.
Possessed by a strong desire to see language used correctly, he
studies the roots of words and their derivation. When he uses a
word, you can be assured that it is the right word in the context.
What other accounting professor uses the word "floccinaucinihilipilification"1 ?
A very private person, he is devoted to his wife and their
family — a son, two daughters, and seven grandchildren. He
and his wife, Margaret, married for forty crowed years, share an
interest in opera and usually have a season ticket for the Sydney
opera season.
He is known as an effective administrator in part because
he could not be bothered wasting time on it. He dealt only with
things that mattered. He made the important decisions, left the
running of programs to those most directly involved, and got
back to his "real" work. Taking advantage of his open door
policy, his colleagues could walk into his office at will to argue a
point, seek clarification, or get help with a reference. He would
be writing when they walked in, put down his pen immediately,
and give them his full attention. When the discussion was over,
and that was sometimes hours later, he would pick up his pen
and just carry on writing as if he had not been interrupted. A
mean debater, he never forced his ideas on his colleagues, although on occasion he would talk for hours in efforts to convince them of the correctness of his arguments.
In this intense and exciting atmosphere, he founded a journal, Abacus, and forged with his colleagues a school of accounting built on a belief in the primacy of market prices. Indeed,
that school of thought usually bears his name. A critic in the

1The habit

of treating things as trivial, as of no account.
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tradition of Canning, Hatfield, MacNeal, Paton, and Sweeney,
he has looked to economics, psychology, and science for evidence. His publications, which include numerous books and
over 200 articles, are representatives of the turning point in the
accounting literature away from descriptions of technical process towards rigorous debate based on scientific method. Further, he was not willing merely to understand what accountants
do; he sought to bring about change, to improve both the study
and the practice of accounting. For over forty years, he has
made many lecture tours at universities throughout the world.
He won the Gold Medal awarded by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, he was the first International
Distinguished Lecturer of the American Accounting Association.
More than a dozen professors of accounting have studied under
him or been his colleague during their formative years. He
served as National President of the Australian Society of Accountants (now called the Australian Society of CPAs) which
shows his commitment to the interaction between academe and
the profession, and he holds many other awards and distinctions including Officer of the Order of Australia and member of
the Academy of Social Sciences of Australia. For all of these
accomplishments, he is named the 51st inductee into the Accounting Hall of Fame, the first one from a "Pacific Rim" country.
R A Y M O N D JOHN CHAMBERS
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RESPONSE
by
Raymond John Chambers
1991 Hall of Fame Inductee
Professor Emeritus of Accounting
University of Sydney, Australia
The Accounting Hall of Fame is unique, for here are joined
in one roster practitioners and scholars. It signifies that each
group contributes in some substantial way to the advancement
of one art. But the modes of contribution are essentially different. Practice demands great versatility, patience and comprehension, to match the exigencies of diverse clients with the performance of a socially necessary task. Scholars and teachers, on
the other hand, serve no immediate clients. Ideally, they are the
monitors of practice in general, discriminators between what is
generally serviceable and what is merely expedient. The essential difference between practice and inquiry was captured by
Francis Bacon, 400 years ago: "lookers on many times see more
than gamesters". More recently, J. B. Priestley expressed the
same idea thus: "Nobody in his senses would expect a born seer
to do. That much is generally acknowledged. But it is equally
ridiculous to suppose that a clashing and triumphant doer can
really see." In that little bit of philosophy lies the reason why
practice and inquiry, in most learned professions, proceed in
tandem, practitioners and investigators doing their own thing
with their special skills, each respecting the domain and the
competencies of the other.
In accounting, it is still otherwise. Teachers and researchers
on a large scale confuse the generally serviceable with the
merely expedient. They have long tried to give the same standing to the habitual and conventional as might properly be given
to firm knowledge and principle. The attempt has been in vain.
The very terms expedient and conventional betray a difference
between mere rules and defensible principles. Confusion of the
two has led some academics to hold that "there is no theoretical
basis for preferring one set of techniques over another," and
"that we should abandon the chimera that we can ever establish
a unified theoretical framework for accounting". There has even
developed a strong strain of disbelief in the possibility of making accounting better than it is, in spite of its logical and practical flaws, flaws that have long been the butt of criticisms of
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practitioners, academics, governmental officials, and business
people alike.
On the other hand, there have been great practitioners who
have dreamed of a better accounting than was prevalent in their
time — among them George O. May, Leonard Spacek and
Henry Benson, to name just three enrolled in the Hall of Fame.
Who but Henry, Lord Benson, could, in the British House of
Lords, describe "annual accounting prepared under the historical cost convention" as "no better than laudable pus"? Dreaming
of ideals is thus not just the special province of academics and
researchers. The practicing arm of the profession has striven
mightily to ameliorate practice, through countless deliberative
committees over decades. Doubtless there is virtue in pooling
the wisdom of the practically knowledgeable. And, doubtless,
where what is taught in textbooks and universities is an
undifferentiated mixture of principles and expedients, the combined wisdom of committees of practitioners has seemed to be
more promising than reliance on the work of independent research workers; but that enterprise, too, has failed, in spite of
the devoted labor and goodwill of members of committee after
committee after committee in this country and elsewhere for
decades. Which should not be surprising; for in no other field of
knowledge and practice is recourse taken to deliberative committees to resolve fundamental problems.
The fundamental questions are: What is the function of accounting? and, How may that function best be served? The general function of accounting is singular — to get at the truth in
financial matters. Only up-to-date truth will secure that persons
entrusted with power over property and the work and prospects
of others do not exercise that power ignorantly, or in a wanton
or self-serving fashion. Getting at the truth thus has a highly
respectable social role. It is a powerful disciplinary influence for
good in business, government, and society at large. Trust, honesty, and fair dealing between those who trust and those who
are entrusted, turn on truthfulness, truthfulness in accounting,
in particular. It must therefore be of serious concern that disregard for the truth is endemic in modern accounting. Practitioners and teachers alike tolerate and justify the notion of conservatism — which means telling less than the truth; the cost doctrine — which entails evasion of the up-to-date truth; and creative accounting — which plainly means tinkering massively
with, or disregarding utterly, the truth. To eradicate such mischievous notions is demanding of the greatest and most altruis-
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tic endeavors of the profession — practitioners and academics
in double harness.
They are still at cross purposes, however. To quote Henry
Benson more extensively: "until we . . . learn that . . . annual
accounts prepared under the historical cost convention are no
better than laudable pus, so long will a large number of our
businesses move remorselessly and deservedly to the mortuary".
But at the same time a substantial segment of the academic
profession seeks to propagate the notion that conventional accounts are not misleading; and it does so by recourse to the
trappings of statistical analysis that not only are incomprehensible to, and therefore beyond appraisal by, practitioners, but
also are the object of critical utterances of mathematicians,
economists, physicists and philosophers alike. Fruitful collaboration between practitioner and academic is unlikely to flourish
where the two sectors of the profession entertain antithetical
ideas.
Mutual and deserved respect and goodwill between practitioners and researchers in other professions have been at the
root of great advances in knowledge and technology. A similarly
fruitful partnership in accounting is devoutly to be wished for.
But it is not an end attainable as long as practitioners put little
trust in independent researchers, researchers concern themselves more with methodological niceties than with the fundamental conditions of serviceable practice, and teachers concern
themselves with propagating the conventional wisdom regardless of its follies.
I have long encountered the names, and many of the persons, of those honored in the Accounting Hall of Fame, professional leaders of eminence and scholars of great reputation. My
engagements through most of my professional life have involved
me in the struggles and anxieties of both sectors of the profession. If I have done anything notable, it has been because I have
been able to draw on the wisdom and stand on the shoulders of
many masters, great in their time and in the vocation of their
choice. But, on the other side of the equator and the other side
of the Pacific, I thought not that I would be summoned today to
join such company.
To The Ohio State University and the Board of Nominations, custodians of the Hall of Fame, to kind advocates unknown to me, I express my deep gratitude for and appreciation
of this day's mark of esteem.
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THE ACCOUNTING HALL OF FAME MEMBERSHIP
Year

Member

1950

George Oliver May*
Robert Hiester Montgomery*
William Andrew Paton*
Arthur Lowes Dickinson*
Henry Rand Hatfield*
Elijah Watt Sells*
Victor Hermann Stempf*
Arthur Edward Andersen*
Thomas Coleman Andrews*
Charles Ezra Sprague*
Joseph Edmund Sterrett*
Carman George Blough*
Samuel John Broad*
Thomas Henry Sanders*
Hiram Thompson Scovill*
Percival Flack Brundage*
Ananias Charles Littleton*
Roy Bernard Kester*
Hermann Clinton Miller*
Harry Anson Finney*
Arthur Bevins Foye*
Donald Putman Perry*
Marquis George Eaton*
Maurice Hubert Stans
Eric Louis Kohler*
Andrew Barr
Lloyd Morey*
Paul Franklin Grady*
Perry Empey Mason*
James Loring Pierce
George Davis Bailey*
John Lansing Carey*
William Welling Werntz*
Robert Martin Trueblood*
Leonard Paul Spacek
John William Queenan
Howard Irwin Ross*

1951
1952
1953

1954

1955
1956
1957
1958

1959
1960
1961
1963
1964
1965
1968

1974
1975
1976
1977
*Deceased

Published by eGrove, 1992

95

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 19 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 7

1991 Accounting Hall of Fame Induction

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

87

Robert Kuhn Mautz
Maurice Moonitz
Marshall Smith Armstrong
Elmer Boyd Staats
Herbert Elmer Miller
Sidney Davidson
Henry Alexander Benson
Oscar Strand Gellein
Robert Newton Anthony
Philip Leroy Defliese
Norton Moore Bedford
Yuji Ijiri
Charles Thomas Horngren
Raymond John Chambers

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol19/iss1/7

96

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1992, Vol. 19, no. 1
The Accounting Historians Journal
Vol. 19, No. 1
June 1992

REVIEWS
PATTI A. MILLS, EDITOR
Indiana State University
REVIEWS OF BOOKS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Dale L. Flesher, The Institute of Internal Auditors: 50 Years of
Progress Through Sharing (The Institute of Internal Auditors,
1991, 180 pp.; members, $15; nonmembers, $20).
Reviewed by
Frank E. Ryerson III
University of Montevallo
This book is a history of the Institute of Internal Auditors
and serves to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the
Institute's founding in 1941. The author, Dale Flesher, does an
admirable job of describing the individuals, events and activities
that were instrumental in fostering the growth of the Institute of
Internal Auditors (IIA) from an initial group of 24 businessmen
to an international organization with over 42,000 members.
The book consists of ten chapters, each of which provides a
chronological discussion of a major IIA-related topic area.
These self-contained histories provide for easy reference to specific topics and allow for continuity of exposition within each
area. Also, in order to provide an overall perspective on the
development of the IIA, the book concludes with a chronological time line which integrates the major events and activities
recounted in previous chapters.
The Introduction chapter describes how a number of major
changes in the internal auditing environment has both expanded and enhanced the role of the internal auditor over time.
The history of the IIA is incorporated into this broader discussion of the profession's development and is attributed a major
role in its evolution. In fact, Flesher states that " . . . for the past
50 years the history of internal auditing has been synonymous
with the history of the IIA" [p. 15]. Support for this assertion is
provided in the remaining chapters of the book.
Chapters Two and Three discuss the leading role the IIA has
played in promoting the emerging professionalism of the internal auditor. This historical review includes descriptions of such
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Institute pronouncements as the "Statement of Responsibilities
of Internal Auditing", "Code of Ethics", and "Standards of the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing" as well as discussions of the IIA's Quality Assurance Review Service and its professional certification efforts. With respect to the history of the
Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) examination, Flesher relates an
interesting anecdote regarding the IIA's deliberations on changing the CIA acronym. Debate over the acronym occurred during
the mid-1980s and arose because international travelers and
certificate holders were in danger of being mistaken by terrorists for members of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
The material in Chapters Four through Six discusses the
development of the IIA as a professional association and reviews the various types of professional service contributions the
Institute has made to the practice of internal auditing. Chapter
Four traces the growth of the IIA in terms of membership, chapters and member services. Chapter Five reviews the history of
the periodicals published by the IIA, with specific emphasis on
the Institute's journal, Internal Auditor, while Chapter Six details IIA activities related to colleges and universities.
The Institute's professional development activities are the
subject of Chapters Seven and Eight. The history of Institute
sponsored conferences, seminars and other continuing education meetings is presented in Chapter Seven. Chapter Eight continues the theme of professional development by examining the
numerous IIA related research projects and publications.
Chapter Nine is devoted to the individuals who have shaped
the IIA over its first fifty years and is divided into three sections:
(1) international volunteer chairmen; (2) key staff members at
the international headquarters; and (3) recipients of major IIA
awards.
The last chapter comments on the success the IIA has had
in adapting to its changing environment and in gaining recognition for itself from other professional associations and various
governments. The discussion then concludes with a brief look
to the future, which includes twelve strategic actions the
Institute's 1990-91 Chairman, A. J. Hans Spoel, has recommended for use as a guide for the next decade.
The only criticism this reviewer has of the book is the presence of several inconsistencies between the text and several exhibits it makes reference to. However, because these inconsistencies are limited in number, they do little to disrupt the flow
of the material, nor do they diminish the overall contribution
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this book makes to our understanding of the development of the
IIA and its associated impact on the professional practice of
internal auditing. Flesher has provided an extensive summary of
the who, what, when, where and why of the IIA. As such, the
book fulfills the dual functions of, first, providing a concise history of the IIA and, second, serving as a reference source for
those interested in exploring the Institute in more depth. The
book also makes a contribution to the accounting literature by
filling the gap in published IIA history which has existed since
the publication of the last history of the Institute in 1977.

O. Finley Graves, ed., The Costing Heritage: Studies in Honor of
S. Paul Garner (Harrisonburg, Virginia: The Academy of Accounting Historians, 1991, 171 pp., $15).
Reviewed by
Jack Ruhl
Louisiana State University
The emblem of the Academy of Accounting Historians
bears the Latin inscription, "Praeterita Illuminant Postera,"
which is literally translated as "Past events illuminate future
events." The inscription hints at a way of evaluating accounting
history research; that is, to what extent does an historical study
illuminate future events? The more the research helps us understand and predict accounting theory and practice, the more
valuable is the research.
Judging by this standard, Monograph 6 is an important
achievement in accounting history research. The monograph is
a collection of ten studies which has cost accounting as its unifying theme. Six of the studies base their conclusions primarily
on pre-20th century materials from both within and outside the
U.S. Three other papers reexamine cost accounting practices in
new and insightful ways. The final study in the monograph outlines pitfalls for accounting history researchers.
As an example of a pre-20th century study, Richard
Mattessich ["Counting, Accounting, and the Input-Output Principle: Recent Archeological Evidence Revising Our View on the
Evolution of Early Record Keeping"] examines archeological
evidence of accounting practices during the period 8,000 B.C. to
3,000 B.C. Mattessich writes that the ancient people of the
Middle East transferred clay tokens from one place to another
as a representation of an actual economic event. He uses this
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and other evidence to argue that the foundation of accounting is
not to be found in double entry bookkeeping. Rather, the foundation of accounting is found in an input-output principle
which is represented by the transferring of the tokens. Put differently, by moving the clay tokens from one place to another,
ancient Middle Eastern people recognized the input-output
character of an underlying economic event. Double entry was of
secondary importance, evolving in the service of the input-output concept.
Richard Fleischman, Lee Parker and Wray Vamplew ["New
Cost Accounting Perspectives on Technological Change in the
British Industrial Revolution"] reassesses the conventional wisdom that the period of the Industrial Revolution was a "cost
accounting wasteland" [p. 14]. The authors examined the accounting records of several firms operating in Britain during
that era and found that detailed cost analyses formed the basis
for major management decisions in these firms. Such decisions
included adoption of new technologies and capital investment.
Further, the authors use these accounting records and related
partnership correspondence to argue that the shortcomings of
cost accounting during the British Industrial Revolution have
been greatly exaggerated. Instead of being a hindrance to industrial development (the conventional wisdom again), cost accounting practices helped managers of that time to make informed decisions on the choice of technology.
Focusing on a 20th-century regulatory agency, Frank
Rayburn ["The Cost Accounting Standards Board: Its Creation,
Its Demise, and Its Reestablishment"] recounts the history of
the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) since its initial
establishment in 1970. He explains the structure of the CASB,
lists the nineteen Standards promulgated by the CASB, and describes the political and economic forces which led to the demise of the original CASB. Rayburn then describes forces which
led to the 1988 reestablishment of the CASB.
Murray Wells ["The Nature of Activity Costing"] looks at
Johnson and Kaplan's Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting (1987) from an historical perspective. Wells
argues that the "activity costing" suggested by Johnson and
Kaplan is not a dramatic new breakthrough, but simply another
conventional product costing system. Further, Wells restates his
conviction that "there should be N O allocations of overhead to
products, cost centers, divisions, or whatever" [emphasis in
original, p. 133]. He concludes that Johnson and Kaplan's major
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contribution is that they underscore the need for managers to
identify costs that are under the control of those managers.
Wells' conclusion implies a need for future accounting researchers to reexamine the perennial issue of cost allocation.
Four of the ten papers in the monograph have been described here. All the papers in the monograph are interesting,
clearly written, and address important cost accounting issues.
Monograph 6 is important because it illuminates (1) the basic
nature of cost accounting, (2) problems with currently accepted
solutions to cost accounting problems, (3) the role of cost accounting on society, and (4) the role of society on cost accounting practice. Finely Graves has done an excellent job editing this
volume, which is an appropriate tribute to the life and work of
accounting history scholar Paul Garner.
REFERENCE
Johnson, H. T. and Kaplan, R. S., Relevance Lost: The Rise and Fall of Management Accounting, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1987.

Finley Graves, Graeme Dean and Frank Clarke, Replacement
Costs and Accounting Reform in Post World War I German (New
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990, 188 pp., $45.00).
Reviewed by
Dieter Schnedier
Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum
Proposals for inflation accounting, developed at the beginning of the "hyper-inflation" after World War I (1919-1923), belong to the most remarkable contributions of German authors
to accounting theories. Moreover, "there is a considerable similarity between the motivations for, and the supporting arguments in favor of, injecting replacement cost or reproduction
cost depreciation and inventory calculations into accounting in
the post-World War I German accounting literature and the
post-World War II U.K. and U.S. literature. . . . In many respects
it has been a case of déjá ju" [p. 33].
Graves, Dean and Clarke explicate this idea by presenting
abstracts, commentary and translations of ten articles published
in 1920 on depreciation, cost accounting and financial accounting procedures in times of inflation, written by well-known Professors of Business Economics in Germany (Prion, Mahlberg,
Geldmacher and F. Schmidt with two chapters of the first edi-
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tion of his Organic Accounting in the Framework of the Economy
and now forgotten managers and professors.
The translation gets into the spirit of the articles and only
rarely lacks conviction, e.g., Geldmacher did not mean in
"Bilznxsorgen" unspecified "Accounting Problems", but "Accountants' Anxieties or Distresses". The abstracts [pp. 3-18] are
very informative but the commentary [pp 21.39] seems partly
disputable.
To present the origins of inflation accounting to the AngloAmerican readership is a laudable effort in the research of accounting history. However, in comparing the discussion after
World War I in Germany with the post-World War II U.K. and
U.S. literature, it seems a bit odd to restrict the presentation to
the first and rudimentary articles written mainly in periodicals
for managers. By this procedure, for example, the outstanding
inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg by Ernst Walb
about the problem of paper profits ("Das Problem der Scheingewinne," Leipzig, 1921) is excluded. Mahlberg and Geldmacher
have published clarifications of their first ideas in later monographs (Mahlburg, Bilanztechnik und Bewertung bei schwankender Währung, Leipzig, 1921; Geldmacher, Wirtschaftsunruhe und
Bilanz, Berlin, 1923). Nicklisch (Professor at the Business Economics School, Berlin) developed in a book review (Zeitschrift
für Handelswissenschaft und Handelspraxis, 1921-22, p. 45) the
concept of nominal or inflation corrected profit, whichever is
lower, an often repeated idea in the 1920s and from the 1950s
on.
To thoroughly compare the German literature after World
War I with its Anglo-American counterpart after World War II,
it would be necessary to analyze the whole period from 19201930. This period includes the 4th edition of Schmalenbach's
Dynamic Accounting (1926), the 3rd edition of Fritz Schmidt's
Organic Accounting and the antithesis by Rieger. Therefore the
contribution of Graves, Dean and Clarke can only be seen as a
useful beginning of accounting history research on inflation accounting procedures.
The preface contains a survey of the politico-economic
background in 1918-19 [pp. XI-XVII]. I cannot see any connections between the socialist revolution 1918 in parts of Germany,
the counter-revolution by parts of the former army in spring
1919 and the accounting problems resulting from price control
and inflation. Without these events the same accounting problem would have existed.
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The editors do not mention the fundamental changes in the
tax structure in 1919 (Erzbergersche Steuerreform), an intellectual feat at the beginning of Weimar republic. The Prussian prewar income tax which excluded capital gains had been changed
to the Schanz (Haig-Simon) concept (nevertheless this attempt
failed because of inflation and was then soon abandoned). The
highest tax rate increased from Prussian's 6% to Weimar's 60%.
Regarding this and the inflation, the section named "Taxation
lobby" [pp. 25-29] in the commentary seems to be inappropriate.
Concerning replacement costs and price fixing, the articles
translated in this anthology should have been compared with
the state of the art of "cost accounting" in Germany before
World War I. The use of cost accounting for pricing had already
extensively been discussed for the first time in 1906-08 (23 articles from a prize competition had been published in the
Zeitschrift für handelswissenschaftliche Forschung), accompanied by research in the theory of costs by Schmalenbach. Therefore, the conclusion [p. 36] "Pre-World War I accounting in Germany is best summarized as being balance sheet oriented" is
not correct. Before 1914, the balance sheet was mainly a research object for jurists. Schmalenbach acknowledges as predecessors of his Dynamic Accounting, the Prussian revenue official, von Wilmowsky (1896-1907) and the Saxon lawyer, R.
Fischer (1905-08).
Discussions in the economic function of depreciation as a
replacement fund date from the 19th century. During that time,
confusion between depreciation and reserves was common and
some of the articles in the anthology partly repeat this confusion. The commentary lacks a thorough evaluation of the articles in the historical context before 1914 and after 1920. Especially, the articles do not reflect the two main directions which
the discussion of inflation accounting procedures in Germanspeaking countries have followed from 1920 up to now: the "volume-reproduction" approach (Substanzerhaltung, in 1920;
Geldmacher and with variations, Schmidt) and the "maintaining
purchase power" approach (in 1920, Mahlberg; later Walb and
Schmalenbach) whose ideas had been presented to the AngloAmerican audience by the same authors in a publication in
19891.
NOTES
1O. F.

Graves, Dean, G. W. and Clarke, F. L., Schmalenbach's Dynamic Accounting and Price-Level Adjustments (Garland Publishing Inc., 1989).
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Roxanne T. Johnson, An Analysis of the Early Record Keeping in
the DuPont Company 1800-1818 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1989, 105 pp., $40).
Reviewed by
Harvey Mann
Brock University
In this slim volume, Johnson introduces us to the undistinguished beginnings of the DuPont business dynasty. In the Introduction to the book, we meet the grandfather, Samuel, and
the father, Pierre, of Eleuthere Irenee DuPont de Nemours
(hereafter E. I.) and learn a little about their lives in France. It is
Pierre who makes the decision to emigrate to America, influenced by the turmoil of the French Revolution and his peripheral involvement therein. This move, however, seems to have
been made without form or serious plan and with hardly any
capital. Pierre formed a company and, as part of his plan, he
gave E. I. the responsibility of establishing a gunpowder manufacturing facility. E. I. had developed an interest in gunpowder
as a teenager and learned more about it over time. Finally, early
in 1801 a "Deed of Association" was drafted and the very poorly
financed company came into existence. It can be noted that this
company was the only successful, albeit, very successful, venture of the DuPont family.
The first bookkeepers of the company are introduced in
Chapter 1. Peter Bauduy has the dubious distinction of being
the first (due less to his prowess with the books than to his
being a shareholder in the company). He is replaced early in
1806 by Raphael Duplanty, who seems to have been familiar
with double-entry bookkeeping and also had some practical experience. In the balance of this chapter, two contemporary
bookkeeping texts are quoted; however, I found the comparison
between these quotes and the books of the company confusing,
to say the least. There are, however, details of the early DuPont
records available in the Hagley Library and Museum in
Greenville, Delaware.
The emphasis in the second chapter is on the initial capitalization, or rather the lack of same, of the firm. The process is
difficult to follow since most of the shares in the company were
not purchased for cash, the record keeping was horrendous, and
the interrelationships of the company, the father's company and
the shareholders were quite confusing. The company survived in
spite of these tribulations due to a provident loan as well as the
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intervention of a dissatisfied Bauduy, who eventually departed.
This leads to Chapter 3 and a consideration of the importance
of cash and cash flows to the operation of the business in the
early 19th century. Very little that is unusual is introduced. A
few journal entries are shown with an emphasis on bills payable
or receivable and very little actual cash being exchanged.
Chapter 4 offers a short recapitulation of the accrual accounting used by DuPont, but does not introduce any new concepts or ideas. This leads to the final chapter where it is concluded that the company had the record keeping it needed to
survive. Mention is made of "work-in-progress" inventory and a
writing-down of fixed assets akin to, but not as systematic as,
depreciation accounting. It is pointed out that the books were
not closed annually but this is excused because of the difficulty
of obtaining the required information from agents across the
country. In a final warning to the reader, Johnson indicates that
any conclusions drawn are firm specific and cannot be generalized to other companies.
The book would benefit from a comparison with accounting practices of like, or even unlike, businesses of the same era.
We do, however, now know a lot more about the early bookkeeping practices of the DuPont enterprise and also about a
treasure trove of data available for further research at the museum in Greenville.

T. A. Lee, ed., The Closure of the Accounting Profession (New
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990, 2 vols., $192).
Reviewed by
Kathie Cooper
University of Wollongong
These volumes are a collection of readings with a difference, which should prove useful to accounting historians, students of accounting history and any person contemplating writing in the area of accounting history. One reason for this is that
the selected readings contain a wide and varied range of interesting and useful material not drawn solely from accounting
history literature but also from other disciplines. Perhaps the
most outstanding feature of the text is that the articles and commentary preceding each of them are structured in such a way as
to illustrate one view of how accounting has shaped and been
shaped by its environment. Even if the reader does not agree
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with all of the views expressed, this eclectic approach is useful
to aspiring accounting history authors. It is not simply a reiteration of historical writings which really adds little to the existing
literature. Rather, it is an analysis and interpretation of historical events drawn from the existing literature and incorporates
new, if radical, ideas. In this context, it demonstrates that history can be used to explain the current state of accounting
rather than for the sake of historical interest alone.
The purpose of the text is to demonstrate that accounting is
a highly complex and inter-related social system comprising
functional and organizational systems which interact with other
organizational systems, for example, business and government.
As a consequence, this study of the historical development of
accounting is undertaken in a systems context with a view to
suggesting an answer to one crucial question posed by Lee in
the Introduction to volume 1:
.. . why a socially-valued and financially well-rewarded
profession such as accounting should have, and be content to have, a relatively static body of knowledge in
which major problems are investigated but not resolved; alternative theories remain theories; and research is desired but its findings are largely ignored
[Introduction and Explanation, no pagination].
An explanation is sought in the notion of systems closure
and, in particular, Robb's concept of supra-human, autopoietic
systems [vol. 2, pp. 245-246]. In systems of this nature, instead
of managing a system, humans become part of a system which
has its own life and is self-managed. However, in its bid to
change, adjust or adapt to its environment, the system reaches
the point of chaos and becomes autopoietic. All sight of what
the system is trying to achieve is lost and self-preservation becomes the overriding objective. Lee's conclusion is that accounting may have reached this point [vol. 2, p. 246].
Each of the articles or "Recommended Readings" is preceded by commentary by Lee in which the theme or explanation
being sought in the readings is identified. Many of the articles
are followed by an additional annotated bibliography. Each of
these features should prove useful to accounting history students and other interested readers.
A primary strength of this text is that it adopts a multidisciplinary approach. There is a strong sociological theme
which is often implied in the articles but not specifically stated.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol19/iss1/7

106

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1992, Vol. 19, no. 1
Mills: Reviews

99

Lee's commentary provides the sociological overview where necessary, thus making the text attractive to a wide range of readers.
For those who are simply interested in accounting history, a
substantial proportion of the text is devoted to the development
of the occupation of accountant through to professionalization.
Even here, however, the "Recommended Readings" have been
selected to demonstrate how accounting, through the ages, has
been an open social system subject to closure and how it has
changed or remained static and the mechanisms of change [vol.
1, p. 219; vol. 2, p. 167].
In summary, even if readers do not agree with all of the
views expressed and the conclusions reached in this text, it
should, for the reasons given previously, be seen as a worthwhile contribution to accounting history literature. As a bonus,
the new areas explored in this text may open the way for further
debate and improvement in accounting.

Paul J. Miranti, Jr., Accountancy Comes of Age: The Development
of an American Profession, 1886-1940 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1990, 276 pp., $29.95).
Reviewed by
Joni Young
Temple University
This book provides a useful history of the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) and conveys the early conflicts and
reactions of various accounting organizations and individuals
within these organizations. Conflicts occurred between practitioners in large and small firms, between practitioners in different geographic areas and between the AIA and academicans.
The book is divided into four sections that trace the history of
the AIA from its beginnings as the American Association of Public Accountants (AAPA) in 1886 to its primacy in 1940.
Section 1, 1886 to 1906, explores the "dawn" of the professional organization. This section emphasizes the divisions
within the "profession" and the absence of an authority focus.
The author contrasts the opinions of two contending professional organizations, the New York Institute of Accountants
(NYIA) and the AAPA, on issues such as whether accounting
was an art or science, the appropriate means of training new
entrants, possible responses to the influx of non-Anglo-Saxons
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into accounting, and the importance of professional designations. Miranti examines the different perspectives of the AAPA
and NYIA leaders in an effort to understand these influences
upon their opinions. However, this section tends to over-emphasize the differences and under-emphasize the similarity of views
among these accountants. Both AAPA and NYIA members believed that accounting was useful in improving society. C. W.
Haskins, an NYIA leader, believed that accounting "could help
to perfect society by promoting efficiency and honesty" [p. 37],
AAPA leaders also believed that accounting "offered great potential for social u p l i f t . . . " [p. 39]. With respect to attitudes about
training, the text provides more evidence of diversity within the
AAPA than of diversity between the AAPA and NYIA.
Section 2, 1900 to 1916, details the continuing search for
professional roles. The AAPA leadership employed the Journal of
Accountancy to promote its professional ideals and views on the
roles of accountants. Miranti employs four brief case studies to
illustrate this search for identity and purpose. The first study
emphasizes auditing and the efforts to require annual audits for
New York insurance companies. The second emphasizes accounting and the sporadic involvement of the AAPA in the public debate about railroad accounting. The third emphasizes consulting and the role of an AAPA committee in advising a government committee on Treasury Department bookkeeping procedures. The fourth emphasizes income taxes and the efforts of
the AAPA to gain government acceptance of accrual accounting.
Section 3, 1917 to 1929, considers the encroachments of the
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Trade Commission in
financial reporting and details the continued division of the profession over proper examinations for new entrants, adequate
licensing requirements, ethics rules and "proper" accounting.
The successful efforts of the AIA leadership in obtaining the AIA
prohibition against "touting" drove many small practitioners
and others to form a rival organization, the American Society of
Certified Public Accountants (ASCPA). During this period, criticisms about the quality of attest work underscored the lack of
agreement among accountants about the classification of attestations and the responsibilities of accountants in undertaking
this work. The American Association of University Instructors in
Accounting (AAUIA) drew attention to the inconsistent application of accounting methods — a condition that practicing accountants were unwilling to change for fear of eliminating the
need for professional judgment.
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Section 4, 1929 to 1940, examines the emergence of the
Securities Acts and explores the coming together of the public
accounting profession into a single representative organization
— the AIA. Although the AIA played little role in the events
culminating in the passage of securities legislation, its members
and all public accountants were forced to increase their level of
independence from clients [p. 153] and to consider developing
accounting guidance to establish "authoritative support". The
AIA responded to an AAUIA challenge by establishing a committee to provide guidance on financial accounting matters. These
challenges by the AAUIA and the changes wrought by the Securities Acts and the SEC played a significant role in facilitating
the AIA merger with the ASCPA.
Miranti discusses the "politically incorrect" attitudes of the
early leaders of the AIA and the role of these attitudes in delaying the AIA merger with the ASCPA. In his discussion of this
merger and in other sections, he describes the racist/sexist attitudes of the AIA leadership and their concern to allow only the
"right men" of the "right" social background into the partnerships of major firms and the inner circle of the AIA [e.g., p. 126,
pp. 169-171, p. 180].
A major concern with the book is the lack of clear purpose
in its opening chapters. In the final chapter, the reader learns
that the author's purpose is to write a history of the AIA: "this
study of the history of the AIA also casts some new l i g h t . . . " [p.
190]. In contrast, the author discusses professions generally and
cites histories of professions such as engineering and medicine
rather than histories of professional organizations in the introductory chapter. This chapter suggests that the book would develop a history of the profession rather than a history of a professional organization, a very different historical focus. This
confusion over focus leads to questions that otherwise might
have been avoided: Why did the author not discuss in more
detail the activities of the ASCPA and other organizations and
their contribution to defining the roles of the auditor and accounting? Why did the author limit accounting professional to
the public accounting professional? Given the emphasis on public accounting, why did the author not examine in more detail
the changing role of the auditor in society and whether the significance and purpose of audits changed during the period studied?
The frequent use of the term "elite" throughout the text
creates confusion for the reader. At times, the term refers to the
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partners in national firms [e.g., p. 111]. At other times, the term
refers to nonaccounting groups such as the Department of Commerce Advisory and Planning Council [p. 167]. At still other
times, the term refers to the leadership within the AIA or to
immigrant British chartered accountants [p. 180]. A consistent
use of the term would have reduced this confusion.
The book conveys the many obstacles to establishing and
maintaining one professional organization to represent the profession. The issues discussed in the book continue to reappear
as subjects of current debates. For example, what should be the
entry requirements for new CPA (150 hour education requirement)? What is the purpose of the audit (does it include an
obligation to detect fraud)? An examination of the influence of
social values in the past upon the compromises and solutions
reached by the AIA suggests the need to carefully consider the
contribution and impact of social values to current and future
changes in the public accounting profession (and other elements of accounting).
Larry Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 278 pp., $37.50).
Reviewed by
Christopher J. Napier
The London School of Economics and Political Science
The use of econometric techniques to address problems in
economic history has been a feature of the last thirty years
[McCloskey, 1987]. Yet there are still few studies that examine
the emerging capital markets of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by applying the statistical procedures that are
so familiar in the case of recent research in finance. Larry
Neal's book is a good indication of the hurdles that have to be
crossed in order to carry out worthwhile historical finance research of a quantitative nature. The first of these is the assembly of raw data. Only a small number of securities and foreign
currencies (rarely more than 20) were traded on the London,
Paris and Amsterdam markets at any time in the eighteenth
century. But Neal could not simply run a computer tape to find
the prices of these securities. He had to locate contemporary
price lists, assess their reliability, and then ensure that the daily
price data were input into a computer file. Given the need to
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process what must have been over half a million pieces of raw
data, it is not surprising that it took Neal a decade to assemble
his security prices, before he could begin to test them.
The second problem that Neal had to overcome was the
possible distortion of his data by institutional factors. One of
the great dangers of quantitative historical research is that a
fascination with manipulating the numbers can easily overshadow the many institutional nuances that set the context
within which the numbers arise. A great strength of Neal's book
is that he is very aware that he must consider carefully the
structural similarities and differences between the main European capital markets, and the changes in these markets over
time. Apparently minor factors in the set up of markets prove
crucial: for example, that stock transactions in London were for
spot delivery while in Amsterdam they were for settlement on
one of the quarterly dates during which transfer books were
open, makes it necessary for Neal to allow for the discount implicit in security prices in Amsterdam because of the later settlement of trades.
Neal adopts a topical approach in his book, much of which
has been published already in the form of journal articles. The
main topics considered are: how integrated were the various
capital markets, and did the degree of integration differ in times
of war and peace; how did financial information diffuse through
European capital markets; how did the great financial "bubbles"
of the early eighteenth century, involving John Law's Banque
Royale in France and the South Sea Company in England, happen; and the extent to which the transfer of wealth by emigres
from the French Revolution fuelled the British Industrial Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. Because of his quantitative approach, Neal is able to demonstrate convincingly how
the South Sea Bubble was the culmination of a long period of
speculation, and how market volatility became much reduced
after the bubble burst. He suggests that the price movements at
the outset of the South Sea Bubble can be explained as a "rational bubble" [Blanchard and Watson, 1982], while those just before the bubble burst could not be so explained.
It is perhaps unfair to criticize quantitative historical research for simply providing statistical confirmation for generally accepted history, but Neal's book does on occasion leave the
impression that the application of quantitative methods has
added very little to our understanding. Where Neal's conclusions are new, they are often only weakly supported by the data.
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For example, Neal suggests that " . . . because the international
capital markets of the time were larger and better organized
than previously thought . . . capital movements from the Continent to Britain explain succinctly why the British Industrial
Revolution took place during that period [1790-1820]" [p. 181].
His evidence for this is largely anecdotal, and Neal has to acknowledge that the main statistics he uses in this context are
"unreliable figures, to say the least" [p. 221].
The contribution of Neal's book for most readers will be the
detailed description of the institutional structure of the London,
Paris and Amsterdam capital markets during the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. One point that Neal stresses is the
emphasis placed by investors on dividends paid by companies
such as the English and Dutch East India Companies. Simple
models of share valuation in terms of capitalizing dividend
streams perform better as predictors of share prices than the
more complex calculations (derived from internal accounting
records) of researchers such as Mirowski [1981]. Neal, therefore, confirms the significance of dividends as the central indicator of investment performance to the stock market, a significance that, at least in Britain, persisted until after the Second
World War (and, it sometimes seems, is still with us).
References
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Leonard Spacek, The Growth of Arthur Andersen & Co. 19281973: An Oral History (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.,
1989, 349 pp., $69).
Reviewed by
Stephen A. Zeff
Rice University
Leonard Spacek was the managing partner of Arthur
Andersen & Co. from 1947 to 1963 and was the person most
responsible for its ascendancy as one of the Big Eight public
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accounting firms. He served as chairman of the partnership
from 1963 to 1970, and retired from the firm in 1973. He was
the firm's innovative leader who challenged conventional wisdom in a conservative profession.
Spacek was unquestionably one of the most colorful and
important figures on the U. S. public accounting scene during
the 1950s and 1960s, and the publication of this oral history is a
welcome event. This volume contains a verbatim transcript
from four days of videotaping during October 1983 and May
1984 (Spacek's 77th year) at the firm's Center for Professional
Education in St. Charles, Illinois. Ten of Spacek's long-time
friends and colleagues took turns at the questioning. They drew
on their diverse associations with Spacek to elicit his recollections about a wide array of subjects: the personality and management style of the firm's founder and namesake, the contributions of the firm's early partners, Spacek's philosophy and strategy as architect of the firm's growth, the reasons behind
Spacek's frequent disputes with professional leaders over accounting principles, and some of the firm's memorable engagements. What emerges from Spacek's rendering of innumerable
anecdotes, some told several times, is the portrait of a decisive,
indefatigable, incorruptible, straight-talking Midwesterner who
is several steps ahead of everyone around him. And, as is evident throughout this oral history, he has a remarkable memory.
One of the anecdotes helps explain the motivation behind
the phenomenal growth during Spacek's tenure at the helm of
the Chicago-based firm. Following Arthur Andersen's death in
1974, Spacek gave several speeches expounding his views on
professional issues. The accounting establishment in New York
was not amused. John L. Carey, the influential secretary of the
American Institute of Accountants, invited Spacek to New York
to meet with the heads of the large firms in the august setting of
the Union League Club. At the meeting, which was chaired by
George O. May, the retired senior partner of Price, Waterhouse
& Co. and the doyen of the profession, Spacek was informed
that "the leadership of the accounting profession must rest in
the hands of the larger, successful firms and that the smaller
firms [such as Arthur Andersen & Co., which was 20th in size]
can enjoy the success but must acknowledge that the leadership
of the profession is in the hands of the larger firms" [p. 55]. This
incident became indelibly etched in Spacek's mind (he refers to
it again on pp. 113, 173 and 179). On hearing May's words,
Spacek immediately resolved that "if it is bigness that it takes to
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have any say in the accounting profession, why then we will
concentrate on first things first. We'll get big. That's when I
really went out for promotion" [p. 55].
Spacek also explains the complications he had to face at the
time of the founder's death, since Arthur Andersen had never
actually signed the partnership contract, and an initial vote was
taken to liquidate the firm. He also discusses the launching of
the firm's training school in 1940 (the first centralized training
program by an accounting firm), the development of the "one
Firm concept", and the opening of overseas offices in the 1950s,
as well as his 1957 Milwaukee speech (a vintage example of
Spacek's outspokenness) which precipitated a Congressional
hearing into railroad accounting and almost led to his expulsion
from the American Institute of CPAs.
That Arthur Andersen & Co. would publish the unadorned
thoughts of its maximal leader is further evidence of the openness for which the firm is well known. But unless the reader
already knows a good deal about the historical development of
the firm, some of the discussion may be confusing. Spacek's
recollections dart back and forth across the years, and the timing of a number of the incidents that he discusses, and their
relation to one another, is not always clear.
The oral history should be read in conjunction with the
firm's 75-year history, A Vision of Grandeur, which was published by the firm in late 1988. The 204-page history is wellresearched, well-written, and handsomely illustrated, but, as far
as I know, it has not yet been reviewed in any of the journals.
The author drew on Spacek's oral history, and conducted a further interview with Spacek.
There is a nice use of footnotes to supply some of the particulars that round out Spacek's responses. I could find only one
error. On page 226, the reference should be to the Committee
on Accounting Procedure, not the Accounting Principles Board.
Northwestern University's Accounting Research Center and
Arthur Andersen & Co. are to be commended for undertaking
this venture. Other firms should be encouraged to do the same.
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